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Abstract 
 
Economists often espouse incentives, arguing that expanding choice sets cannot lower welfare. 
Yet, laws worldwide restrict incentives for many transactions, partly due to an untested concern 
that incentives cause poor decisions. I show experimentally that incentives skew information 
gathering and beliefs about what a transaction entails in a way that causally influences the 
participation decision, as policy makers suspected. A model of costly information acquisition 
shows this behavior is consistent with rationality, and thus unconcerning from an ex ante 
welfare economic perspective, but demands consideration under reasonable alternatives. The 
mechanisms apply in any situation where incentives interact with information acquisition. 
JEL-Codes: D030, D040, D840. 
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Offers of large sums of money . . . could lead some prospective participants to enroll ... when it
might be against their better judgment and when otherwise they would not do so.
- National Bioethics Advisory Commission (2001)
1 Introduction
Many policies incentivize people to participate in transactions about which they know little.
In these cases people typically acquire information before they are willing to make a decision.
For certain such transactions, including organ donation, gestational surrogacy, egg donation,
or medical trial participation, countries around the world tightly restrict incentives, or outlaw
them altogether, despite the potentially enormous welfare costs of such laws.1 One important
reason for these restrictions (among others) is the fear that incentives would interfere with sound
decision making. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017), the influential
concept of undue inducements entails “that something is being offered that is alluring to the
point that it clouds rational judgment ... Attention is fixated on the benefit, disallowing proper
consideration of the risks”. Similarly, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (2007)
urges that “Payments to women providing oocytes should be ... not so substantial that they
... lead donors to discount risks,” and speculates that “the higher the payment, the greater the
possibility that women will discount risks.”2 These concerns are foreign to many economists,
on two grounds. First, economists are keenly aware that one cannot, in expectation, make a
rational decision maker worse off by offering higher incentives for a transaction. Second, the
concern that incentives somehow warp individuals’ perception of the transaction appears at odds
with the standard rational agent model. Thus, many economists believe that ethical concerns
about incentives are at least partly due to confusion about elementary economics (Becker and
Elias, 2007). However, an investigation into the effects of incentives on the nature and quality of
decision making for transactions with complex and potentially hard-to-understand consequences
has been lacking.
In this paper, I study how incentives affect the quality of decisions in contexts where in-
formation about the transaction is costly. In two behavioral experiments, I find that higher
1For instance, Held et al. (2016) estimate that the ban on incentives for kidney donation is responsible for
the premature death of up to ten thousand Americans on the waiting list each year. The same authors estimate
that restrictions on incentives for kidney donation cost taxpayers $12 billion annually, due to the expensive
nature of current treatments for kidney disease relative to the estimated cost of a donor kidney.
2See also the quote by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (2001) above, as well as Kanbur (2004),
Satz (2010), Grant (2011), and Sandel (2012). Satz explicitly mentions “a paternalistic concern that sellers
would actually be harmed by the sale of their organs, but that ... they would sell their organs if it were legal.”
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incentives skew subjects’ information acquisition towards encouraging sources and away from
discouraging ones. As a result, they shape subjects’ beliefs about the deliverable, which, in
turn, causally influence the ensuing participation decision. I demonstrate that this mechanism
applies not only to experimental subjects, but also in a model of rational Bayesian agents. That
model both helps clarify the welfare implications of the effects I document, and shows which
empirical findings are, and are not, evidence for poor decision making. Most fundamentally, I
show that by shaping people’s beliefs about their choice options, incentives genuinely persuade.3
This result has implications in any situation in which information acquisition and incentives
interact, encompassing fields as diverse as finance, marketing, and political economy (detailed
in Section 6). In the domain of ethical concerns with incentives, this result shows that incentives
can make people appear, for example, as though they “discount risks”, even if they are entirely
rational. For social planners concerned with the expected welfare of entirely rational individuals,
incentives lead to ostensibly concerning behavior, that, upon closer inspection, is in fact no cause
for alarm. In case of imperfectly rational individuals, or for planners whose welfare criterion
does not solely depend on the sum of expected utilities (for instance, because it accounts for
ex post inequality, see Cappelen et al. (2013); Andreoni et al. (2015)), objections may indeed
be justified in specific cases.
This paper consists of three main parts: two experiments and a simple theoretical model.
The first experiment emphasizes ecological validity and thus uses a transaction about which
subjects have homegrown preferences and prior beliefs. The second experiment is complemen-
tary to the first, and is designed to precisely determine the behavioral mechanisms in a more
stylized setting.
For the first experiment, I select a transaction that is similar, in a precisely defined fashion,
to those for which incentives are restricted by law. Specifically, it needs to be one that subjects
have not previously considered, that is visceral, and that presents an opportunity to selectively
access multifaceted information. I do not attempt to capture any other aspect of the legally-
restricted transactions. Indeed, it is unnecessary to do so, as long as the transaction leads to
the type of behavior the ethics literature is concerned about, and thus enables an investigation
of that behavior. Because the transaction also needs to be safe and legal, I have experimental
participants decide whether to ingest whole insects in exchange for money. Some subjects are
offered $30 for eating an insect while others are offered $3. Given the offers, but before making
a decision, subjects then choose between watching a video with the title “Why you may want
to eat insects” and one with the title “Why you may not want to eat insects”. Once they
3In the language of the ethics literature, I show that incentives lead to self-persuasion. The latter is defined
as cases in which “an influence agent’s intervention does provoke ... self-generated reasons [that] succeed in
persuading the person to adopt precisely what the influence agent advocates” (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986).
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are done watching the video they have selected, they decide whether to consume the animals
in exchange for the promised incentive. I document that the higher incentive induces more
demand for the encouraging video and less demand for the discouraging one. Using a control
condition, I show that this differential information acquisition causally skews subjects’ beliefs
about the disutility of eating insects, the distribution of reservation prices, and that it sways
the participation decision subjects ultimately make.
At first glance, these results appear to confirm the worries of the ethics literature. The
model, based on costly information acquisition, however, shows that such behavior is consis-
tent with rational Bayesian decision making.4 Intuitively, the reason is the following. When
information is costly, a decision maker will often find it optimal to reach a decision based on
incomplete information. This exposes her to two possible types of error: A false positive occurs
if she participates when she would have abstained with full information. On the other hand,
a false negative occurs if she abstains when she would have participated with full information.
The incentive for participation affects information acquisition because an optimizing decision
maker will direct attention so as to make more expensive mistakes less often. With a low incen-
tive, one has little to gain from participation but potentially much to lose, so that false positives
are the expensive type of mistake. In this case, the decision maker will focus on information
she expects to effectively prevent mistaken participation. Hence, she will demand information
she expects will likely decrease her beliefs that participation is the right choice—information
that is discouraging. By contrast, a sufficiently high incentive makes false negatives the more
expensive type of mistake. These would cause her to mistakenly forego that large payment. In
this case, the decision maker will focus on information that she expects to effectively prevent
mistaken abstention. Hence, she will demand information that will likely increase her beliefs
that participation is the right choice—information that is encouraging. Hence, even a rational
Bayesian may look as though she were trying to convince herself to participate when incentives
are high. Generally, this mechanism applies under two conditions: First, the informational
environment needs to be sufficiently rich to allow the decision maker to trade off false positives
and false negatives. Second, the information costs must be of a similar order of magnitude as
the stakes of the decision. Hence, the mechanism applies both in the limited-stakes experiments
in this paper, and in highly consequential decisions, such as organ donation, for which fully
comprehensive information is extremely expensive to acquire. (To illustrate, most people do
not acquire a doctorate in nephrology before deciding whether to donate a kidney.)
4Bayesian inference can also explain seemingly irrational behavior in other domains. For instance, Benoˆıt
and Dubra (2011) show that it is consistent with Bayesian rationality for 60% of automobilists to consider
themselves above-average drivers.
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The welfare implications of these findings depend on both the planner’s welfare objective,
and the extent to which empirical behavior is rational. Thus, I employ a second experiment to
study choice in a setting sufficiently stylized to allow for an explicit test of rationality. I first
confirm that the observed behavior is consistent with the directional predictions of the theory
and conceptually replicates the findings of the first experiment. I then compare objective
posterior beliefs with elicited ones and find that they align closely. While this indicates a
substantial degree of rationality, the deviations I do observe are those that may be concerning
to ethicists and policy makers—higher incentives make subjects overly optimistic about the
consequences of participation.
This paper contributes to four literatures. First, it bridges a gap between disciplines by
using standard economic methodology to inform a concern about the effects of incentives that
is both widely-held in the applied ethics literature and highly influential in policy.5 It is a
part of the burgeoning literature on repugnant transactions (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler,
1986; Basu, 2003, 2007; Roth, 2007; Leider and Roth, 2010; Niederle and Roth, 2014; Ambuehl,
Niederle and Roth, 2015; Elias, Lacetera and Macis, 2015a,b, Ambuehl and Ockenfels, 2017).
While existing research characterizes people’s motives for preventing others from engaging in
voluntary transactions, the present paper focuses on a specific motive and examines whether
its underpinnings stand empirical and theoretical scrutiny.
Second, it adds to the behavioral economics literature on incentives (see Kamenica (2012)
for a review). It shows that incentives skew subjects’ acquisition and interpretation of external
information about a transaction in a way that amplifies their effect. This paper therefore
complements a literature that studies the inferences that subjects draw from the incentive per
se (Kamenica, 2008; Cryder et al., 2010; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006). In that body of work,
reservation prices typically change in a way that diminishes the effect of incentives; for instance
high incentives may signal that the transaction is unattractive, causing reservation prices to
increase. This paper shows that people will behave as if trying to persuade themselves in cases
where they mostly rely on external information about the transaction, whereas they will act
in a manner consistent with the aforementioned literature if the main source of information
about the deliverable is the incentive itself. The experiments control for other direct effects of
incentives such as anchoring (Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec (2003), see Maniadis, Tufano and
List (2014) for a review), or motivation crowding (Titmuss (1970), see Frey and Jegen (2001)
for a review).
5This paper cannot and does not take a stance on whether incentives for any particular transaction such as
living organ donation should be limited. The welfare and policy implications are more nuanced; see Sections
4.4 and 6, respectively.
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Third, it contributes to the literature on motivated reasoning by modeling the phenomenon
in a fully rational setting with standard preferences (see Gino, Norton and Weber (2016);
Be´nabou (2015); Be´nabou and Tirole (2016) for reviews in economics, and Kunda (1990);
Klayman (1995); Epley and Gilovich (2016) for reviews in psychology). It therefore allows for
an explicit test of the extent to which the phenomenon is consistent with Bayesian rationality.
Fourth, it contributes to the literature on endogenous information acquisition (Caplin and
Leahy, 2001; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2002, 2011; Suen, 2004; Koszegi, 2006; Eliaz and Spiegler,
2006; Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2011), specifically to the theory of rational inattention (see
Caplin (2016) for a review). The experiment in Section 5 is an explicit experimental test
thereof.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews some of the
laws and guidelines that restrict incentives for transactions. Section 3 demonstrates the main
behavioral patterns in an experiment that emphasizes ecological validity. Section 4 presents the
theoretical model and relates it to welfare analysis. Section 5 conceptually replicates the first
experiment, explicitly tests the model, and measures the extent to which empirical behavior
conforms to Bayesian rationality. Section 6 discusses policy implications, and briefly outlines
implications of this paper in fields such as finance, political economics, and health economics
(in which medical experts charged with the acquisition and interpretation of information are
influenced by incentives), as well as to information economics (informational moral hazard),
and to marketing (bait and switch). Section 7 concludes.
2 Policies that restrict incentives
This paper identifies a mechanism with applications in diverse domains. Its focal motivation
is the laws and guidelines that constrain incentive payments, a selection of which I review
here. These regulations share three attributes: First, at the core, they all seek to protect
the people targeted by incentives. Second, they neither intend to discourage the activities
per se whose incentives they limit, nor do they merely attempt to prevent people from making
potentially large mistakes. Rather, the concern is about inducing people to make decisions they
might regret.6 Altruistic participation, by contrast, is often applauded (e.g. Macklin, 1981).
Third, each of these laws and guidelines covers a complex transaction and thus incorporates
considerations that this paper does not address.
One category of such laws concerns research with human subjects, both non-medical (such as
psychological science or experimental economics) and medical. Many are based on the Belmont
6This is particularly apparent when incentives are deemed coercive (Macklin, 1981; National Bioethics Ad-
visory Commission, 2001; McGregor, 2005; Ripley, 2006).
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Report (1978) which states that “undue influence ... occurs through an offer of an excessive
... reward or other overture in order to obtain compliance.” The concern is that an offer may
be “so excessively desirable that it compromises judgment” (Emanuel, 2004). Consequently,
incentives that can be paid for research participation are limited in the United States (National
Bioethics Advisory Commission, 2001), the European Union (Hughes et al., 2010), and many
other jurisdictions.
Another category concerns transactions involving the donation of human tissue, such as
kidneys (Open Letter To President Obama, 2014; Vatican Radio, 2014)7 and bone marrow
(World Marrow Donor Association (2011)). In both of these cases, a crucial argument is that
incentives would distort prospective participants’ assessment of the costs and benefits of the
transaction, possibly to their detriment (Satz, 2010; Grant, 2011; Kanbur, 2004). The World
Marrow Donor Association (2011), for instance, states that “remuneration may ... cause the
prospective donor to withhold personal health information for fear of being disqualified from
donation, preventing an accurate risk assessment and disclosure of risks specific to that donor.”
Moreover, incentives are frequently restricted in the domain of reproductive technologies.
While the U.S. permits commercial human egg donation, the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine (2007) recommends that “payments to women providing oocytes should be fair and
not so substantial that they ... lead donors to discount risks”. Gestational surrogacy falls in
the same category. The states Nevada, New Hampshire and Washington prohibit payments to
surrogate mothers except for particular expenses that are explicitly listed in the states’ statutes,
out of concern for the surrogate mother.
Finally, many jurisdictions prohibit engagement in sexual activity for material compensa-
tion. A prominent view maintains that the decision to sell sex harms prostitutes, even if they
choose to engage in the transaction of their own free will (Farley, 2013; Danna, 2014).
The claim that incentives skew the assessment of consequences associated with a participat-
ing in a transaction has also been made in various other domains. Incentives are outlawed, for
instance, in student athlete recruiting on the grounds that they constitute “undue influence”
(National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2015).
3 Incentives and information about a visceral transaction
In this section, I conduct a laboratory experiment to study how incentives affect the acquisition
and interpretation of costly information about a transaction with which subjects are unfamiliar.
The main test concerns a comparative static on the supply curve. If incentives truly skew the
7Paid living kidney donation is outlawed in every country of the world, except for the Islamic Republic of
Iran (Rosenberg, 2015b).
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acquisition and interpretation of information in the way the literature hypothesizes, and if that
skewed information ultimately affects subjects’ participation decision, then the elasticity of
supply should be larger in cases where selective endogenous information acquisition is possible
than in cases where it is not. Additionally, I study the direct effect of the incentive magnitude
on information demand, as well as on the resulting changes in beliefs about what the deliverable
entails and in reservation prices.
The experiment emphasizes ecological validity by using a real transaction about which sub-
jects have homegrown beliefs and preferences. It is complementary to the experiment in Section
5, which trades off ecological validity for a greater ability to distinguish between mechanisms
in a stylized setting with induced preferences (Smith, 1976).
The transaction in this experiment needs to have three key features. First, it should give
prospective participants the opportunity to consult rich and multifaceted information and thus
to access and interpret it selectively. Second, it should be unfamiliar and visceral. This property
makes it difficult for subjects to assess the disutility of participation in monetary terms, which
potentially renders reservation prices malleable. Third, it must be feasible in the laboratory.
Hence, I have subjects decide whether to ingest whole insects in exchange for cash payment.
This transaction is unfamiliar and aversive to the vast majority of participants, it is visceral,
and there is rich and multifacted information available about insects as food.8 Finally, the
transaction is safe and feasible in the laboratory, since I use insects raised specifically for
human consumption.
Clearly, insect eating differs on countless dimensions from transactions for which incentives
are limited by law (examples include altruistic concerns and irreversibility). This experiment
does not attempt to replicate these other dimensions, and does not need to. Indeed, it demon-
strates that the attributes it does replicate are sufficient to cause skewed acquisition and inter-
pretation of information, as well as corresponding changes in beliefs about what the deliverable
entails and in reservation prices. The conclusions drawn from this experiment thus extend to
any transaction that shares this limited set of attributes.9
3.1 Design
Structure. The experiment follows a 2×2 across-subjects design. The first dimension is the
incentive amount, which takes a value of either $3 or $30 in exchange for eating an insect. The
8The transaction is intensely aversive to most subjects. Some reported that the experiment was “stressful”
or that the “insects were scary”, and others refused to even touch the containers they were packaged in. Even
in countries such as China, Thailand, and Mexico, insect eating is not practiced by a wide majority. Rather, it
is concentrated within particular regions and / or communities, and often limited to a small number of insect
species. In my data, Asians and Hispanics are neither more nor less willing to eat insects than Caucasians.
9In other contexts, these effects may be counteracted by other forces.
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second dimension is whether a subject can select and watch one of two videos about human
consumption of insects (the video and no video conditions, respectively). A comparison between
the latter two conditions permits the main test whether the supply of willing participants is
more price-elastic when endogenous information acquisition is possible than when it is not.
Briefly, the experiment follows four stages (detailed below). First, receive an offer specifying
the magnitude of the incentive. Although they are not yet asked for a decision, knowledge of
the incentive may affect how they acquire and interpret information about the transaction.
Second, subjects select and watch one of the two videos which emphasize, respectively, the
upsides or downsides of eating insects (in the video treatment only). Third, they reveal their
reservation price for eating insects. Fourth, they decide whether to eat the insect for the
incentive amount they were initially promised. I incentivize subjects to pay attention to the
videos and to use them as the main source of information about the transaction by asking them
to make all decisions without having seen the actual animals they may be about to consume.
Subjects then participate in ancillary treatments. The rules for payment and consumption of
insects ensure that it is in the subjects’ best interest to reveal their genuine preferences in each
decision.
Specifics of the main stages (1 - 4). In stage 1, subjects learn the incentive amount they
will be offered, and that they will decide, for each of five food items, whether to eat the item in
exchange for that amount. Only at this point do they learn that all of the food items are whole
insects that are either baked, or cooked and dehydrated, and produced for human consumption.
Subjects know of both incentive amounts and that they are randomly assigned to one of them.10
Hence, they cannot rationally draw inferences about the experience of eating insects. While
effects such as anchoring may still apply, the no video condition serves as a control that allows
me to difference out any effects pertaining to the payment amounts per se.11
Only subjects in the video condition participate in stage 2; those in the no video condition
proceed directly to stage 3.12 Participants choose between watching a 6-minute video entitled
“Why you may want to eat insects” (the encouraging video) and one called “Why you may not
10In contrast, subjects in the video condition are unaware that other subjects cannot acquire any information,
and vice versa.
11Payment amounts per se may affect subjects’ decisions through at least four channels. First, because subjects
are informed of both payment amounts, they might be unhappy if they receive the $3 incentive. Second, eating
insects for less compensation may give the subject more bragging rights. Third, a high incentive amount may
crowd out intrinsic motivation to eat insects (Frey and Jegen, 2001). Fourth, incentive amounts may serve as
an anchor for subsequent decisions (Maniadis et al., 2014).
12Due to this setup, subjects in the video condition have more time to contemplate their choice, and thus
additional opportunity to think about the transaction, perhaps in a way that depends on the incentive amount.
The objective is not to identify the effect of the specific menu of videos I offer, but rather to identify the
effect of opportunities for selective acquisition and interpretation of information in general. The additional
contemplation time in the video treatment furthers that objective.
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want to eat insects” (the discouraging video). These video titles, and the approximate 6-minute
duration are all the information subjects have when making that choice.13 To capture the idea
that information is costly, subjects are not allowed to watch both videos. Moreover, to ensure
sufficient statistical power, each subject in the video condition must watch at least one video.
In this sense, subjects can choose the type, but not the amount of information to acquire. (The
experiment in Section 5 complements this design choice in that it places no restrictions on
the kind or amount of information a subject can acquire.) Subjects watch the selected video
directly after choosing it. Because the videos are fairly long and contain significant detail,
incentives may affect not only which video a subject chooses, but also which parts of the video
the they pay attention to.14
In stage 3, subjects reveal reservation prices by filling in a multiple-decision list for each of
the following five food items: 2 house crickets, 5 large mealworms, 3 silkworm pupae, 2 mole
crickets, 2 field crickets. On each line in each list they decide between the options “Get $p. In
exchange, eat the food item” and “Do not participate in this transaction,” for multiple values
of p ranging from $0 to $60 in 21 increasingly large steps.15 They click on the line at which
they prefer to switch from refusing the transaction to accepting it; the remaining choices are
filled in automatically.
In stage 4, subjects decide, separately for each of the five food items, whether to eat the
insect in exchange for the incentive they were promised in stage 1.
Payment and execution of consumption decisions. Each subject makes many decisions.
To incentivize truthful revelation of preferences, exactly one of all decisions is randomly chosen
for implementation at the end of the experiment. The selected decision entirely determines a
subject’s payment and consumption of insects. The implementation probability varies across
decisions. There is an 80% chance the decision selected for implementation is from stage 4.
The reason is that those decisions are not only an outcome measure, they are also intended
to influence how subjects acquire and interpret information about insect consumption. The
strength of the latter effect likelyincreases with the chance that a stage 4 decision will be
implemented. Table 1 details the implementation probability of the remaining stages.
13Each video lists various reasons for or against human insect consumption. Transcriptions and links to the
videos are included in Appendix D.
14Subjects in the video condition also select at least four out of a selection of 9 video clips, grouped in bins of
three named “Reasons for eating insects”, “Reasons against eating insects”, “Other information about eating
insects”. Subjects face a 3% chance of watching the selected clips, and a 97% chance of watching the selected
6-minute video. See Appendix A.6 for details and analysis.
15 The amounts are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12.5, 15, 17.5, 20, 22.5, 25, 27.5, 30, 33, 36, 39, 44, 50, 60. Resolution
is finer at lower levels to increase statistical power in light of the positively skewed distribution of reservation
prices. The amount $3 was not included in the decision lists for the first 79 subjects.
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Implementation probability
Main stages
1. Learn incentive amount to be offered in stage 4: $3 or $30.
2. Select encouraging or Discouraging video and watch it (video condition only).
3. Reveal reservation price for each food item. 7%
4. Participation decision for each food item. 80%
Ancillary stages
5. Insects are handed out.
6. Reveal reservation price for each food item. 7%
7. Predict others’ reservation prices. 6%
Implementation
8. One decision randomly selected for implementation, insects consumed (if selected)
Table 1: Experiment timeline. Instructions for stages 1 through 6 are read out aloud in the
beginning of the experiment. Stage 7 is a surprise. Instructions are displayed on subjects’
screens immediately before that stage.
All subjects are assured that all insects will be consumed in the privacy of a visually secluded
space in the presence of only the experimenter who ensures that the subject consume the animals
in entirety. This minimizes social motives, such as trying to impress others.
Subjects make many consumption decisions before seeing the actual insects, and thus may
be unpleasantly surprised (see Appendix D for pictures of the food items). While I cannot
force participants who change their mind to ingest insects against their will, the design must
nonetheless ensure that participants do not accept transactions with the expectation of a reneg-
ing option on the decision selected for implementation. Hence, a subject who reneges on the
selected decision not only forfeits whatever she would have received for eating the insect, but
must also pay an additional fee of $20 (subjects who rejected the selected transaction cannot re-
nege). This penalty is taken out of a $35 completion payment that the subject would otherwise
receive.16 Subjects are aware of all of these rules from the outset of the experiment.
Ancillary stages (5 - 7). In stage 5, all subjects receive five containers. Each is filled with
insects and a folded piece of paper with a code. They must enter all codes into the computer,
which forces them to open each container, remove the label from within and thus view and
16The Stanford Institutional Review Board would not give ethics approval for this experiment until I suggested
to present this penalty to subjects as follows: “You will be paid at least $15 if you complete this experiment,
regardless of your choices. In addition ... you automatically receive $20 if you ... follow through with the
decisions you make”
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(inadvertently) smell each of the insects.17 In stage 6, they again reveal their reservation
prices.
In order to measure whether subjects are aware of the effects of incentives on others, stage
7 asks them to predict the reservation prices of other participants. Subjects make separate
predictions for other participants in the $3 and in the $30 incentive conditions, but only for
participants in the same video condition as themself.18 Because this stage comes as a surprise,
subjects’ own decisions are not influenced by considerations of how others would decide.19
There is a 6% probability that the accuracy of a randomly-selected prediction will determine a
subject’s payment. If so, she will not consume any insects, and her $35 completion payment is
reduced by $0.50 for each $1 that her prediction differs from the true mean.20
3.2 Implementation and preliminary analysis
Implementation A total of 671 subjects participated in one of 39 computerized sessions in
May, June, and July 2015 at the Ohio State University (499 subjects), Stanford University (110
subjects), and the University of Michigan (62 subjects). 271 subjects participated in the no
video treatment (136 and 135 with $3 and $30 incentives, respectively), and 400 participated in
the video treatment (197 and 203 with $3 and $30 incentives, respectively).21 A large number
of subjects is required since individuals’ willingness to eat insects is highly heterogenous. Each
session lasted about 2.5 hours and contained both payment conditions. Either all or none of the
subjects in a session were in the video condition. At the beginning of the each session I read
the instructions aloud.22 I recruited subjects using the universities’ experimental economics
participant databases. The invitation emails mentioned that the experiment would involve the
17As a filler task during the handing out of the insects, subjects complete an extended version of the Cognitive
Response Scale (Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2014), and sets D and E of Raven’s (1960) standard progressive
matrices.
18Subjects first make a prediction for an average participant. They then separately predict the mean reserva-
tion price of those who were offered $3 and $30, respectively, in randomized order.
19Subjects were informed at the beginning of the experiment that stage 6 would be followed by additional
decisions, that they would learn later what they entail, and that the chance that one of them would determine
their payment was 6%.
20A subject thus maximizes her expected payoff by stating the median of her beliefs about the true mean.
21See Appendix Table A.5 for summary statistics about the subjects.
22Instructions are reproduced in Appendix D. The experiment was coded in Qualtrics. I had expected a much
larger number of subjects at the University of Michigan, but only 62 were available. The fraction of subjects
in the video condition exceeds 50% because only that condition reveals information choice. The 79 Stanford
students who first participated in this experiment were not given any decisions regarding field crickets. The 48
first Stanford students also did not make any predictions about other participants. In addition, 68 Stanford
students participated in an exploratory treatment. Data from the exploratory treatment are not included in any
analysis as that treatment was poorly calibrated. The vast majority of participants saw highly visceral images
of insects, which muted the effects of endogenous information acquisition.
11
consumption of food items on the spot, but did not mention insects.23 It asked recipients not
to participate if they have food allergies, are vegetarian or vegan, or eat kosher or halal.
Subjects could renege on the decision selected for implementation in exchange for $20 if
they had agreed to eat an insect. Five participants (0.8%) chose to do so. All of them were in
the $30-condition.24
Randomization check. Randomization into treatments was successful. Of 24 F -tests for
differences in subjects’ predetermined characteristics across the four treatments, only one is
significant at the 5% level, and four more are significant at the 10% level. This falls within the
expected range. Details are in Appendix A.1.
Summary statistics. Eating insects is aversive to most participants. For each of the five
species, column 1 of Table 2 lists the fraction of subjects who have a positive reservation price
in stage 3. For each item, at most 5% of subjects would eat it for free. The median reservation
price is substantial, ranging from $9 to $18.75 (column 2). There is also a substantial percentage
of subjects who would not eat the insect even for the highest incentive amount offered in the
multiple price lists ($60), ranging from 18% to 30% (column 3). Nine percent are not willing
to eat any insect for any price in any multiple-price list.25
(1) (2) (3)
Reservation price
Fraction > $0 Median Fraction ≥ $60
2 house crickets 0.96 9.00 0.18
5 large mealworms 0.96 18.75 0.30
3 silkworm pupae 0.95 13.75 0.23
2 mole crickets 0.96 13.75 0.24
2 field crickets 0.95 13.75 0.22
Table 2: Summary statistics of reservation prices elicited in stage 3. $60 is the highest
price offered in the multiple-price lists. 9% of subjects reveal a reservation price ≥ $60 for all
five species. Data pooled over treatment conditions. Interval midpoints are used for analysis.
n = 671.
23An exception exists in the invitation emails in Michigan, and those for the last 31 Stanford subjects, which
mentioned that the experiment involves the voluntary consumption of food items, including edible insects. This
information had no statistically measurable effect on the fraction of participants who refused to eat an insect
for any price offered.
24Four of the five were in the video condition, and three had opted for the encouraging video.
25Each decision made in stage 4 of the experiment is also made as a part of a multiple-price list in stage 3.
These decisions are sometimes inconsistent. See Appendix A.2 for details.
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Analysis. In all analyses, I control for subjects’ gender, ethnicity, as well as a second or-
der polynomial in age,26 and I include university and species fixed effects. All constants are
estimates for the mean participant. Data from the multiple-price lists are interval-coded. I
use interval midpoints for analysis. The results are robust to alternative specifications (see
Appendix A.7).
3.3 Main analysis
Result 1: Higher incentives raise the demand for encouraging information. With
higher incentives, subjects are more likely to demand information that encourages rather than
discourages eating insects. The fraction of subjects choosing the discouraging video drops by
over a third, from 18.3% to 11.3%, as incentives rise from $3 to $30. The effect size of 7.01
percentage points is measured with a standard error of 3.60 percentage points (clustered by
subject, n = 400, linear regression).27
Hence, incentives skew subjects’ information acquisition. This then raises the question:
are subjects merely selecting the video that makes it easiest to follow through with the choice
they would have made anyway, or does the skewed information acquisition alter the subject’s
ultimate participation decision?
Result 2: The supply of participants is more elastic when endogenous information
acquisition is possible. I now study the supply curves. Does the selective information
acquisition induced by the incentive ultimately affect subjects’ consumption decision, or does it
merely rationalize a decision subjects would have made anyway? I observe the decision subjects
would have made anyway in the no video condition, since it does not allow for endogenous
information acquisition. If selective information acquisition induced by incentives indeed affects
subjects’ participation decisions, the slope of the supply curve in the video condition should
differ from that in the no video condition.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that 37.17% of subjects in the no video condition are willing to eat
insects in exchange for $3 (averaged across the five species). This number rises to a significantly
higher 59.57% if the incentives are raised to $30, an increase of 22.39 percentage points. In this
condition, incentives work because a higher incentive exceeds the reservation price of a larger
number of subjects.
In the video condition, the supply response also depends on another mechanism. Due to
incentives’ effect on how subjects acquire and interpret information, a change in the incentive
26Due to the presence of some outliers in age.
27See Appendix A.7 for Probit and Logit specifications.
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amount may now also change reservation prices. If skewed information acquisition leads sub-
jects to convince themselves to participate when incentives are high, participation rates will
now respond even more strongly to an increase in the incentive.
Indeed, in the video condition, increasing the incentive from $3 to $30 raises the participation
rate from 37.69% to 70.53%. This is an increase of 32.84 percentage points, which is 10.44
percentage points more than the effect produced by the same $3 to $30 increase for the no
video condition. The supply response in the video condition is nearly one-and-a-half times
that in the no video condition, as Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates. Incentives skew information
acquisition, which in turn affects subjects’ participation decisions.
This analysis intentionally does not condition on the video each subject chooses to watch, for
two reasons. First, the choice of information is one possible mechanism driving the behavior
that this experiment is designed to document. Statistically muting this mechanism would
defeat the purpose of the experiment. Second, the choice of video is not the only mechanism
that could drive the effects. Incentives may also change how subjects pay attention to, and
let themselves be persuaded by the chosen video. This is plausible since the videos contain
a variety of arguments, each of which one may deem more or less convincing, depending on
incentives.28
Result 3: Higher incentives lower reservation prices. I now analyze the effect of incen-
tives on reservation prices. They capture subjects’ expectations about the disutility of eating
insects.
This analysis presents two challenges, one experimental, the other statistical. Experimen-
tally, the fact that subjects are first presented with an incentive amount, and are then asked to
reveal their reservation price potentially invites anchoring effects (Maniadis et al., 2014). To
illustrate, the offer of $15 that subjects encounter in the multiple-decision lists may look quite
attractive to someone who was initially promised an incentive of $3, but would appear diminu-
tive to someone who had been promised $30. Through anchoring, incentives raise reservation
prices.
If, however, larger amounts of money cause subjects to convince themselves that insect-
eating is not as bad as they might otherwise have thought, then a higher incentive would lower
reservation prices. For instance, a subject may not even begin to consider eating insects for
28Conditioning on the choice of video would seem to allow for the quantification of the relative importance
of the two effects. Such an analysis, however, would be confounded by the endogenous selection of the video.
Instead, I show that changes in how subjects interpret information must play a role, in two ways. First, Section
3.4 shows that the choice of the video alone suffices to explain neither the difference in the slope of the supply
curves, nor the effect on reservation prices. Hence, incentives must also cause subjects to interpret the same
video differently. Second, the experiment in Section 5 does not offer an explicit choice between sources of
information, and hence must work entirely through differential interpretation of the same information.
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A. Supply curves B. Reservation prices
Incentive $3 $30 Difference $3 $30 Difference
Information
no video 37.17 59.57 22.39*** 20.86 26.83 5.97***
(3.39) (3.41) (4.78) (1.76) (1.59) (2.26)
video 37.69 70.53 32.84*** 20.79 19.51 -1.28
(3.01) (2.55) (3.93) (1.60) (1.45) (2.10)
Difference 0.52 10.96** 10.44* -0.07 -7.32*** -7.25**
(4.56) (4.33) (6.19) (2.32) (1.99) (3.06)
Table 3: Panel A shows the percentage of participants who are willing to eat the food item
for the offered incentive amount (averaged over the five food items), by treatment. Panel B
shows estimates of mean reservation prices in dollars elicited in stage 3 by treatment, amongst
those who are willing to eat at least one species of insect in exchange for $60 or less. *, ** and
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Asterisks are
suppressed for levels.
incentives of a mere $3, and $15 may not make her change her mind, either. But an incentive
of $30 at the beginning of the experiment may induce her to start contemplating what was
previously unthinkable, and even convince herself that eating insects is not all that bad. With
this different viewpoint, she may now even accept the $15 offer in the multiple-price list. After
all, she has already convinced herself.
The anchoring mechanism relies merely on the presence of different promised incentives that
precede the elicitation of reservation prices. Anchoring should thus be present to comparable
extents in both the video and no video conditions. Selective information acquisition, by con-
trast, is limited to the video condition. Therefore, I will measure the effect of incentives on
expectations by the difference in their effect on reservation prices across the video and no video
treatments.
The econometric challenge here consists of subject heterogeneity and censored observations.
While the vast majority of subjects are willing to eat insects once the incentive becomes suf-
ficiently large, a minority are opposed to the idea of eating any insect for any compensation
in the experiment, including the maximum of $60. For those subjects, neither $3 nor $30 is a
high incentive. Hence, one cannot reasonably expect such subjects to respond to the incentive
variation. Additionally, even if a subject’s reservation price is less than $60 for some species,
it may exceed that threshold for others, and will thus be censored.
I estimate the effect of incentives on the reservation prices of subjects who are willing to eat
at least one species of insect in exchange for $60 or less. I use a version of Cragg’s (1971) double
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hurdle model, which endogenously determines the incidence of the two types of subjects and
simultaneously accounts for censoring. I account for the panel structure of the experimental
data using the methods in Dong, Chung and Kaiser, 2004 and Dong and Kaiser, 2008.29
The results are shown in Panel B of Table 3 and Figure 1. In the no video treatment,
there is a sizable anchoring effect. The increase in the incentive from $3 to $30 leads to a
$5.97 increase in reservation prices, from $20.86 to $26.83. If incentives do not lead subjects to
form different expectations about the experience of insect-eating, then we should expect to see
a similar change in reservation prices for the video condition. The data, however, show clear
evidence to the contrary.
For subjects in the video treatment, the increase in the incentive leads to a decrease in the
average reservation price, from $20.79 to $19.51. The difference in the effects across the video
and no video conditions is a significant $7.25. Hence, incentives change subjects’ expectations
by influencing how they acquire and interpret information.
These effects persist beyond the distribution of the insects. Receiving the insects lowers
the mean reservation price in the (video, $30 incentive)-treatment by $2.52, raises it in the
(no video, $3 incentive)-treatment by $1.24, and leaves it close to unchanged in the remaining
conditions. The difference-in-differences across treatments remains virtually unchanged.30
Result 4: Subjects are not fully aware of these effects, neither in others, nor in
themselves. To study subjects’ awareness of the effects of incentives, I use stage 7 of the
experiment, in which subjects are incentivized to guess other subjects’ reservation prices to the
best of their abilities. Subjects make separate guesses for those in the $3 and $30 conditions,
respectively. Subjects thus reveal how they expect incentives to affect others’ reservation prices.
I compare the actual effect of incentives to these beliefs (see Appendix A.4 for details). To dis-
entangle anchoring from the effects of skewed information acquisition, recall that subjects guess
the reservation prices of others who were in the same video / no video condition as themselves.
Data from subjects in the no video condition reveal whether they anticipate anchoring; data
from those in the video condition show whether they correctly predict the combined effect of
selective information acquisition and anchoring.
Recall that higher incentives raise reservation prices in the no video condition. In stage 7,
the average subject’s prediction is very accurate. Not only do subjects correctly predict the sign
29I use the Stata implementation by Engel and Moffatt, 2014. See Appendix A.3 for details. The Cragg
(1971) double hurdle model nests the Tobit model. Both models consist of two terms, one that determines the
probability that an observation is censored, and one that determines the distribution of uncensored observations.
The Tobit model imposes the restriction that any explanatory variable enters each of these terms with the same
coefficient, the Craggit model does not. I test and reject this restriction in Appendix A.3.
30See Appendix A.5 for details.
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A. Supply Curves B. Reservation Prices
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Figure 1: Panel A shows how the treatments affect the fraction of subjects willing to eat
insects for the promised incentive. Panel B shows how the treatments affect reservation prices.
Data in both panels are taken from Table 3.
of this effect, they also accurately guess its magnitude (p > 0.5 for a test of the Null hypothesis
that predicted and actual effect sizes are equal).
The video condition offers a striking contrast. Subjects in that condition make predictions
about others who are also in the video condition. These predictions are directionally wrong and
far off in magnitude (p < 0.01) . In fact, predicted incentive effects are the same regardless of
whether they concern others in the video condition or others in the no video condition. Hence,
subjects correctly predict that others are subject to the anchoring effect, but they entirely fail
to anticipate that incentives also cause others to selectively acquire and interpret information
in a way that alters reservation prices.
Not only do subjects fail to predict the effects of skewed information acquisition in others,
they also misperceive the extent to which they are affected themselves. To see this, recall that
subjects in the video condition who face the $30 incentive have a lower average reservation
price than those who are given the $3 incentive. Subjects in the former condition also make
predictions which are, on average, $2.62 lower than those than those in the latter condition
(p < 0.05). Hence, subjects in the (video, $30 incentive)-condition appear to first convince
themselves that insect eating is not that bad, and are then unable to fully unbias their beliefs
when asked to predict the reservation prices of others, in spite of monetary incentives for
accuracy.
17
Mechanism: Choice between videos or different interpretation of a given video?
Incentives may affect participation decisions and reservation prices not only through the choice
between the videos, but also by changing which parts of a given video a subject pays attention
to, and how convincing she deems it. Two back-of-the-envelope calculations reveal that the
data are at least partially driven by the latter mechanism.31 First, higher incentives lead to an
additional increase in participation of 10.44 percentage points in the video treatment compared
to the no video treatment. This exceeds the 7.01 percentage point increase in the number of
subjects choosing the encouraging video, which therefore falls short of explaining the effect on
participation. Second, suppose that the entire difference-in-difference estimate of the effect on
reservation prices of $7.25 is wholly due to subjects’ choice of video (rather than a differential
interpretation of it). Since subjects in the $30-condition chose the encouraging video only
7.01 percentage points more often, it follows that in order to explain the effect of $7.25 on
reservation prices, the effect of watching the encouraging rather than the discouraging video on
reservation prices would need to be on the order of $7.25 / 0.07 = $103.55. This is much more
than the largest difference that could possibly be measured by the price lists ($60). In fact, the
reservation prices of those who watched the discouraging video exceed those of other subjects
in the video treatment by only $10.60 (standard error 3.59).32
3.4 Alternative interpretations
Through the four results above, the experiment paints a coherent picture. Incentives affect how
subjects acquire and interpret information in a way that systematically skews their beliefs about
what the transaction entails, and this change in beliefs affects the participation decision that
subjects ultimately make. For each individual result, there are alternative explanations that I
address here. None of the alternatives, however, can naturally explain the entire collection of
findings. Because this experiment emphasizes ecological validity and thus involves homegrown
preferences and beliefs, however, the rigor with which I can separate mechanisms is limited. The
complementary experiment in Section 5 addresses this point by trading off ecological validity
for the ability to precisely delineate mechanisms.
Ex-post rationalization and cognitive dissonance. It is conceivable that a subject de-
cides to accept the transaction immediately upon being notified that her incentive is $30 (or
to immediately refuse for an incentive of $3), and merely chooses between videos as a means
31Additionally, Appendix A.8 analyzes the data of only those subjects who opted for the encouraging video,
and finds qualitatively unchanged results. That analysis ignores the endogeneity of the video choice.
32Clustered by subjects, estimated using university and species fixed effects. This statistic reflects a choice.
It is therefore not an unbiased estimate of the effect of watching one over another video.
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to rationalize this choice ex post, for instance, to resolve cognitive dissonance. Such ex-post
rationalization can explain the results for both video choice and reservation prices. It is incon-
sistent, however, with the fact that supply is more elastic in the video condition than in the
no video condition. According to ex post rationalization, the information in the video should
not change whether subjects decide to eat insects for money since that decision has already
been made. The induced change in supply elasticities, however, shows that skewed information
acquisition does in fact affect participation decisions.33
Can anchoring alone explain the findings? In this experiment, incentives affect reser-
vation prices differently when endogenous information acquisition is possible than when it is
not. A possible explanation could be that the information in the video condition simply elimi-
nates anchoring without affecting beliefs about the experience of eating insects. A priori, this
explanation conflicts with a literature that documents substantial anchoring effects even when
subjects have nearly complete information about the transaction they are evaluating (Ariely et
al., 2003).34 A posteriori, the data refute the hypothesis in two separate ways. First, subjects
in the video treatment who receive the high incentive predict significantly lower reservation
prices for others. They must have convinced themselves that eating insects is not as aversive
as previously thought, and are unable to unbias these beliefs in spite of incentives for accuracy.
If beliefs and reservation prices were influenced by anchoring alone, we would expect no such
result, or the opposite. Second, this hypothesis does not easily explain why the the fraction
of subjects willing to eat insects for $30 is larger in the video than in the no video condition.
For anchoring to explain this effect, it is not sufficient that valuations are drawn towards the
anchor, they would—implausibly—need to overshoot: in the no video condition, the $30 anchor
would have to increase reservation prices from a value below $30 to some value above $30.
Additionally, the experiment in Section 5 addresses concerns about anchoring where that
mechanism cannot play a role by design.
Confirmation bias and positive testing bias. The psychology literature on confirmation
bias and positive testing bias shows that people often seek and interpret information in a
way that tends to confirm the hypotheses they currently hold (Klayman, 1995; Rabin and
Schrag, 1999). The results of this experiment can be interpreted as another manifestation
33The data are consistent with the following, more involved account of ex-post rationalization, however.
Subjects might anticipate how easily they will be able to rationalize their choice, and might be more likely to
accept the transaction if it is easier. This mechanism relates to the idea that subjects may select particular
sources of information, not because they merely affect beliefs about the experience of eating insects, but because
they directly affect that experience. The experiment in Section 5 precludes this explanation.
34Participants in Ariely et al. (2003) were given a sample of the aversive stimulus (obnoxious noise) before
they were subjected to the anchor and revealed their reservation price to listen to more of the same noise.
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of this tendency. Additionally, however, they show the hypothesis that is being tested. If
incentives are high (low), individuals start with the mindset that participation (abstention) is
the optimal choice. This is not trivial; one could alternatively imagine high incentives triggering
heuristics that make people more keen on exploring the potential downsides of the incentivized
transactions, which would result in the opposite effect.
Beliefs or preferences? Information acquisition has two potential effects that the present
experiment cannot disentangle. On the one hand, information can change beliefs about the
costs and benefits of eating insects without affecting the actual sensory experience. On the
other hand, information might make it easier or harder to eat a given insect. The experiment
in Section 5 mutes the latter channel by design and demonstrates that incentives lead to similar
effects as in the current experiment when belief changes are the only possible mechanism.
4 Information acquisition about a transaction by a Bayesian
agent
In this section, I present a model of costly information acquisition to study how incentives
affect a rational Bayesian agent’s information acquisition and beliefs about the deliverable of
a transaction. I show that even though the findings of the first experiment in this paper
confirm the behavioral hypotheses of the ethics literature on incentives, such behavior is not
necessarily a cause for concern. Specifically, higher incentives typically induce rational Bayesian
agents to demand and interpret information in a way that is more favorable to participation,
thereby altering her expectations about what the deliverable entails. The model helps clarify
the welfare standards under which this behavior may justifiably be regarded as concerning. It
also highlights how to empirically determine whether these conditions are satisfied. All proofs
are in Appendix Section B.3.
4.1 Setting
An agent decides whether or not to participate in a transaction in exchange for a material
incentive m. He is uncertain about what the deliverable entails. The (dis)utility of providing
the deliverable depends on an unknown state s ∈ {G,B}. The state is good (s = G) with
prior probability µ, and bad (s = B) otherwise. If the agent participates and the state is good,
the total utility derived from providing the deliverable and obtaining the incentive amount is
positive, piG + m > 0. If he participates and the state is bad, providing the deliverable yields
disutility piB such that total utility is negative piB +m < 0. If the agent does not participate,
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he receives utility of 0. Hence, he would like to participate in the good state, and abstain in
the bad state.
Before the agent makes her participation decision, he can acquire information about the
state, and thus arrive at a posterior belief that the state is good. If the posterior is sufficiently
high, the agent participates; otherwise he abstains. If the posteriors are non-degenerate, the
agent thus faces a positive probability pB of participating in the bad state (committing a false
positive error) and a positive probability 1 − pG of abstaining in the good state (committing
a false negative error). Different information structures lead to different distributions of pos-
terior beliefs, and therefore to different bundles of state-contingent participation probabilities
(pG, pB). Therefore, the choice of information is equivalent to a choice between pairs of false
positive and false negative probabilities. In this model, the agent chooses these probabilities
directly.
Crucially, information acquisition is costly. The cost of the information associated with a
pair of state-contingent participation probabilities (pG, pB) is given by the real-valued differ-
entiable function λ · c(pG, 1 − pB), where λ > 0 is a constant that parametrizes the marginal
cost of information. This assumption best fits an environment that is informationally rich, so
that many information structures and thus many pairs of state-contingent participation prob-
abilities are available. I assume that c satisfies four conditions: First, c is increasing. This
implies that better information is more costly. Second, c is convex. This captures the idea
that marginal decreases in the false positive and false negative probabilities are more costly the
more information one already has. Third, since the agent can implement any choice probability
that does not depend on the state of the world without acquiring any information, I assume
that c(q, 1 − q) = 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Fourth, I ensure an interior solution by assuming that
limpG→1 c(pG, 1 − pB) = ∞ for all pB < 1, and limpB→0 c(pG, 1 − pB) = ∞ for all pG > 0.
These conditions encompass Shannon mutual information costs, the workhorse assumption of
the rational inattention literature (Sims, 2003, 2006; Mateˇjka and McKay, 2015).
Choosing state-contingent participation probabilities in practice. Sequential infor-
mation acquisition (Wald, 1947) is an example of how one can plausibly choose state-contingent
participation probabilities in practice. To see how, consider an agent who acquires information
in small pieces, such that his posterior belief about the state evolves over time. The agent obeys
the following decision rule. He decides to participate as soon as his posterior about the state
being good is sufficiently high, and he decides to abstain as soon as the posterior is sufficiently
low. Otherwise, he continues acquiring information. The choice of the threshold values that
trigger a decision corresponds to a choice of pG and pB . For instance, an agent who chooses an
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upper threshold that is far from his prior implements a low false-positive probability. Figure 2
illustrates a decision rule that leads to low pG and low pB (participation / abstention thresholds
1), and another rule that leads to higher pG and pB (participation / abstention thresholds 2).
35
Interpretation of state-contingent payoffs. In this model, a decision maker commits a
false positive or false negative error if he takes an action that differs from the one he would
have taken under full information. Hence, one may usefully interpret piG (piB) as the change in
expected lifetime utility of a prospective participant for whom participation (abstention) is the
optimal action, conditional on all information about the utility consequences for that decision
maker that is potentially available at the time of the decision. Due to individual heterogeneity,
different people may face different states.36	
drift	if	s	=	B	
drift	if	s	=	G	
Prior	
P(G|data	avilable	at	t)	
Abstention	threshold	1		Abstention	threshold	2		
Participation	threshold	1		Participation	threshold	2		
t	
Figure 2: Selecting (pG, pB) with sequential information acquisition. If s = G, then P (G|data)
drifts upwards, otherwise it drifts downwards. The decision maker keeps acquiring information
until P (G|data) hits an upper threshold, in which case he participates, or until P (G|data) hits
a lower threshold, in which case he abstains. The further a threshold is from the prior, the
less likely the subject makes the corresponding decision in error. In this example, both pG
and pB are smaller for the solid, black thresholds (thresholds 1) than for the red, dashed ones
(thresholds 2).
35Morris and Strack (2017) and He´bert and Woodford (2017) formally relate information cost functions across
sequential and static information acquisition problems.
36In the case of kidney donation, for instance, these values incorporate the change in expected quality-adjusted
years of life. Accordingly, information acquisition extends beyond medical facts. The agent is interested in
comprehensive information about how donation affects his life, for instance through constraining the professional
and leisure activities he may want to pursue. It is also up to him to determine the extent to which medical
consequences will affect his well-being (such as fatigue that may arise as a side effect of donation (Tellioglu et al.,
2008; Beavers et al., 2001)). The ethics literature on informed consent argues explicitly for such a comprehensive
definition of understanding the intervention (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986).
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4.2 Analysis
In this section, I characterize the comparative statics of optimal information acquisition re-
garding incentive amount m. I begin by characterizing the agent’s objective function. If
the agent selects state-dependent choice probabilities (pG, pB), he obtains the upside payoff
piG + m > 0 with probability µ · pG, and the downside payoff piB + m < 0 with probabil-
ity (1 − µ) · pB . With the remaining probability, he does not participate in the transaction
and obtains utility 0. Hence, his ex ante expected utility, excluding costs of information, is
U(pG, pB ;m) = µpG(piG + m) + (1 − µ)pB(piB + m). The decision maker chooses the pair of
probabilities (pG, pB) to solve the following problem.
max
pG,pB
U(pG, pB ;m)− λc(pG, 1− pB) (1)
How does the solution to this problem depend on the monetary incentive m? The answer
is most easily seen graphically. Figure 3 depicts a part of the agent’s choice set.37 The vertical
axis depicts pG, the horizontal axis depicts (1 − pB). Both of these are goods; they are the
probabilities of avoiding an erroneous decision, conditional on the state. Hence, the higher up
an agent’s chosen bundle, the smaller is the probability of a false negative. The further right
the chosen bundle, the smaller the probability of a false positive. I separately plot the level
curves of U and those of the cost of information function c on this space. The level curves of U
are straight and parallel lines, since U is a linear combination of pG, (1− pB) and a constant.
U increases towards the upper right corner of the graph. The level curves of c are concave,
since c is convex.
The agent chooses whether to acquire any information at all, and if so, what information,
and hence which bundle (pG, pB), to select. Throughout, I consider the case in which he does
acquire information. Hence, for an initial level of material compensation m, the agent’s optimal
choice may be a vector such as point A in the figure.
The total effect of an increase in m derives from a substitution effect and a stakes effect. We
obtain the former by temporarily interpreting problem (1) as the Lagrangian for the maximiza-
tion of U subject to a constraint on information acquisition costs, c(pG, 1 − pB) = c¯ for some
fixed c¯. An increase in m raises the weight of the good pG in the utility function U and lowers
that of (1−pB). Intuitively, the increase in the weight on pG reflects the increased opportunity
cost of non-participation, whereas the decrease in the weight on (1− pB) reflects the fact that
higher incentives partially insure against adverse outcomes. Hence, the indifference curves tilt
to the left, and the constrained optimum shifts upwards and to the left; for instance to a bundle
37The agent’s choice set is [0, 1] × [0, 1], and bundles where pB > pG are dominated. For ease of exposition
only a subset is depicted.
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Figure 3: Panel A. Effects of an increase in the incentive amount m. The horizontal axis
plots 1 − pB , the probability that the agent rejects if the state is bad; the vertical axis plots
pG, the probability that the agent accepts if the state is good. The choice set is {(pG, pB) ∈
[0, 1]2 : pG ≥ pB}. For better visibility, only a subset is plotted here. Straight lines represent
indifference curves of a Bayesian decision maker. Curved lines are iso-cost functions. The
solid, black arrows indicate the substitution effect. The dashed, red arrows indicate the stakes
effect. Panel B. Contours of the posterior beliefs P (s = G|participate) (dashed red lines) and
P (s = G|abstain) (solid black lines) for prior µ = 0.5. Both posteriors increase towards the
upper right.
such as point B. The agent is now more tolerant of false positives and takes greater care to
avoid false negatives. He acquires a different kind of information.
An increase in m not only changes the relative cost of false negatives and false positives, it
also changes the total stakes of this decision. Hence, the agent may choose to spend a different
amount of resources on information acquisition. If the agent chooses to acquire a larger amount
of information, his optimal bundle will move towards the upper right, for instance to a one
such as point C.38 This further decreases the incidence of false negatives, and counteracts
the increase in false positives arising through the substitution effect. The stakes effect will
not outweigh the substitution effect as long as the information cost function c has a negative
cross-derivative. Posterior separability of the information cost function is a sufficient condition.
(Posterior-separability is introduced in Caplin and Dean (2013b) and is satisfied, for instance,
for Shannon mutual information costs.) The following proposition characterizes the total effect;
the condition that the participation probabilities differ across states means that the agent bases
his choice upon a positive amount of information, rather than on his prior alone.
38Depending on parameters, the stakes effect may have the opposite direction.
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Proposition 1. Consider an increase in the incentive from m to m′, with m′ > m. Let
(pG, pB) and (p
′
G, p
′
B) denote the associated optimal state-contingent participation probabilities.
If, moreover, pG 6= pB and p′G 6= p′B, then the following holds:
(i) p′G > pG and p
′
B > pB if
∂2c
∂pG∂pB
< 0 everywhere.
(ii) If c is posterior-separable, then ∂
2c
∂pG∂pB
< 0 everywhere.
Even if a higher incentive increases both false positive and false negative probabilities pG
and pB , it is still possible for it to lead to decisions that are better in the sense that the
agent has more extreme posterior beliefs both after participating and after rejecting. The
following proposition shows that if c is posterior-separable, a higher incentive induces the agent
to participate at a less extreme posterior. Equivalently, conditional on participation, the agent
is more likely to regret his decision ex post.39
Proposition 2. If c is posterior-separable and twice differentiable, and if pG 6= pB and p′G 6=
p′B, then
∂
∂mγparticipate < 0 and
∂
∂mγabstain < 0.
Graphically, Panel B of Figure 3 displays iso-posterior curves for γparticipate and 1−γabstain.
Both functions increase toward the upper right. If c is posterior-separable, Proposition 2
therefore bounds the stakes effect relative to the substitution effect.
4.3 Why Bayesian behavior may look worrisome to a third party
Suppose a third party observes how the agent described by this model responds to an increase
in the incentive amount. She will notice three patterns, which may easily be misconstrued as
evidence of irrational self-deception, despite the fact that they derive from optimization by a
Bayes-rational decision maker.
First, the agent demands information about the transaction that he expects will more likely
be favorable to participation. To see why, think of the decision maker as following a signal that
either tells him to participate or to abstain. The ex ante probability of participation is then
equal to the chance of receiving a “participate” signal. It is given by
p = P (participate) = µpG + (1− µ)pB (2)
39Posterior separability implies that local variations in the prior do not change the agent’s optimal distribution
of posterior beliefs. Formally, c is posterior separable if it can be written as follows. Let p = µpG + (1− µ)pB
the unconditional participation probability, and let γparticipate =
pGµ
p
and γabstain =
(1−pG)(1−µ)
1−p be the
agent’s posterior belief about the event {s = G} if he has observed a signal that makes him participate and
abstain, respectively. c is posterior separable if it can be written as c(pG, pB) = −h(µ) + ph(γparticipate) +
(1 − p)h(γabstain) for some strictly convex function h : [0, 1] → R. c is the Shannon mutual information cost
function if h is the negative of the binary entropy function, h(x) = x log(x) + (1− x) log(1− x).
25
According to Proposition 1 (i), higher incentives lead to an increase in both pG and pB , and
therefore to an increase in the ex ante probability with which the optimal information structure
recommends participation.
Second, because the higher incentive induces a different optimal choice of information, the
agent will have different beliefs about what the deliverable entails. Specifically, as the incentive
increases, so does the chance that the agent’s posterior beliefs exceed his prior. This is also a
consequence of equation (2) and the fact that pG and pB increase with the incentive.
Third, the observer will notice that as the incentive for participation increases, a larger
fraction of people who decided to participate ex post regret the decision. The reason is given by
Proposition 2. According to that result, higher incentives induce subjects to participate based
on lower posterior beliefs that the state is good, and that posterior is precisely the chance that
the agent will not regret his decision ex post .
Through these three channels, Bayes-optimal behavior is therefore consistent with, for in-
stance, the hypothesis by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (2007) that “the
higher the payment, the greater the possibility that women will discount risks [of providing
oocytes].”
4.4 Welfare implications
Whether and when a social planner should be concerned with incentive effects in an environment
of costly information acquisition depends on both the planner’s welfare objective and the extent
to which people empirically conform to Bayesian rationality.
Rational agents. First, consider the case of fully rational agents. In this case, introducing
or increasing incentives to induce participation in a transaction cannot make people worse off ex
ante. Hence, incentives are no cause for concern under a standard welfare economic perspective.
But as incentives rise, so does the false positive probability, and hence the number of people
who ex post regret participating. Therefore, introducing or raising incentives will generally not
be an ex post Pareto improvement, even if the recipient of the transacted good unambiguously
benefits. There are two welfare objectives under which these ex post effects are potentially
concerning.
First, members of the general population (Cappelen et al., 2013; Andreoni et al., 2015) and
professional ethicists (Satz, 2010; Kanbur, 2004) alike consider ex post undesirable outcomes
worrisome in and of itself, in particular as they involve extreme outcomes such as destitution,
or irreversible outcomes such as death. These concerns apply even if the actions that caused
the outcome were entirely voluntary (Kanbur, 2004). Examples abound; policies as diverse as
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veteran service, personal bankruptcy laws, and emergency medical services mitigate adverse
outcomes regardless of whether they result from voluntary decisions.40
Second, a policy that reduces some individuals’ ex post welfare potentially raises inequality,
even if it increases ex ante expected utility—particularly so if it predominantly affects the poor.
In this case, the question whether to implement an incentive policy involves an equity-efficiency
tradeoff.
Additionally, purely self-serving reasons (such as concerns about re-election) may render
a politician wary of a policy that may cause significant ex post regret, even if it is ex ante
beneficial.41
Irrational agents. If introducing or raising incentives leads to irrational reactions, then peo-
ple who participate when a rational individual would have abstained may suffer from the policy
even from an ex ante point of view. In this case, voluntary transactions are no longer Pareto
improvements, and standard welfare economic arguments no longer imply they should necessar-
ily be supported. Whether and by how much incentives skew the acquisition and interpretation
of information about a transaction in an irrational manner is an empirical question. The ex-
periment in Section 5 provides a preliminary answer; the observed deviations from rationality
are minor.
4.5 Interpretation and extensions
Scope of the model. The predictions of this model apply as long as individuals choose
to acquire incomplete information. This raises the question whether they still apply with high
stakes decisions, such as organ donation. The answer depends not on the absolute magnitude of
the stakes of the decision, but on how that magnitude compares to the information acquisition
costs, as can be seen by dividing equation (1) by λ. Therefore, the predictions of the model
apply to both the limited-stakes experiments in this paper, and to highly consequential decisions
in which fully comprehensive information is extremely expensive to acquire, such as kidney
donation. (To illustrate, most donors do not acquire a doctorate in nephrology.) The model
predictions do not apply in cases where information acquisition is either prohibitively expensive,
or close to costless relative to the stakes of the decision.42
40Of course, there exist additional rationales for each of these policies.
41To illustrate, the documentary Eggsploitation (2011) criticizes incentives for egg donation based on ex post
unfavorable outcomes.
42Ambuehl, Ockenfels and Stewart (2017) explore this mechanism in depth, showing both theoretically and
experimentally that agents with higher marginal costs of information acquisition respond more strongly to
changes in incentive amounts. Higher incentives therefore lead to a disproportionate selection of subjects
with high costs of information acquisition who choose to participate based on a weaker understanding of the
transaction.
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Standard effects of incentives. In this model, supply responds to incentives only because
it leads to differential information acquisition. A perfectly informed decision maker, however,
would always abstain in the bad state and participate in the good state as long as −piG < m <
−piB , leading to a non-responsive supply. In this sense, the model abstracts from the fact that
a higher incentive will often increase participation simply because it exceeds the reservation
price of a larger number of people. Appendix B.1 allows for both effects and shows that results
remain essentially unchanged.
Learning about magnitudes. This model assumes that the state-dependent payoffs piG
and piB are fixed and known; learning only concerns the probability of the state. In any
applied setting, by contrast, people likely also acquire information about the distribution of the
magnitude of the (dis)utility associated with providing the deliverable. Appendix B.1 extends
the model to include uncertainty about magnitudes by allowing the unknown state s to take
any value on the real line. The qualitative conclusions remain unchanged.
Interpreting the insect experiment. As argued in Section 4.3, the model predicts behavior
similar to that observed in the insect experiment: Higher incentives skew subjects’ information
acquisition towards more encouraging sources and away from discouraging sources in a way that
affects participation decisions, and they alter beliefs about the deliverable of the transaction.43
Since that experiment is not designed to be a test of the theory, a more detailed mapping
is speculative.44 Two salient differences between that experiment and the model are: First,
subjects are required to choose one of only two available information sources (although they
may have leeway in how to interpret each video). Second, information in that experiment may
not only change beliefs about the experience of eating insects, it may also affect that experience
directly.
An explicit test of the model is in the experiment in the following section.
43In particular, the model predicts that with higher incentives, subjects become more interested in the en-
couraging video, under the following assumption: The encouraging video is more likely to increase beliefs than
the discouraging one, in every state of the world. Formally, the encouraging and discouraging videos corre-
spond to pairs (p+G, p
+
B) and (p
−
G, p
−
B) of state-dependent participation probabilities, with 1 > p
+
G > p
−
G > 0
and 1 > p+B > p
−
B > 0. Note that this assumption is not a statement about how convincing subjects will find
the video after having watched it. For instance, the assumption does not rule out the possibility of someone
choosing the encouraging video and finding it so unconvincing that she forms even more pessimistic beliefs about
insect eating than if she had watched the discouraging video. In fact, this is precisely what would happen with
positive probability to a Bayesian if the encouraging video decreases the false negative rate 1 − pG sufficiently
relative to the increase in the false positive rate pB , since the pessimistic realization of the Bayesian posterior,
P (s = G|abstain) = µ(1−pG)
µ(1−pG)+(1−µ)(1−pB) is decreasing in pG and increasing in pB .
44Specifically, barring additional assumptions, the model does not make a prediction about how incentives
will affect average posterior reservation prices. By the law of iterated expectations, the distribution of posterior
beliefs is a mean-preserving spread of the prior, and the type of spread depends on the incentive. Hence, the
effect of the incentive on mean posterior beliefs depends on the shape of the mapping of posterior beliefs into
reservation prices.
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5 Incentives and information in a stylized experiment
In this section I present an experiment that conceptually replicates the experiment in Section
3, that is sufficiently stylized to allow for an explicit comparison between empirical behavior
and Bayesian rationality, and that permits a rigorous test of the model in Section 4. The
design excludes explanations that might apply to the insect experiment but do not have an
interpretation within the primitives of the model. For instance, the only good involved is
money, so that the treatments can only affect beliefs about outcomes rather than the outcomes
per se. (In the insect experiment, by contrast, it is conceivable that watching an unpleasant
video about insects may make the experience of ingesting them more revolting.)
5.1 Design
The structure of this experiment parallels the first four stages of the experiment in Section
3. The difference is that subjects are not incentivized to eat insects, but instead to take an
unattractive gamble. Someone who takes it and gets lucky loses nothing; someone who gets
unlucky loses $3.50. Each happens with known prior probability 0.5.
The experiment follows a 2× 2 design. Each subject participates in each condition exactly
once, in random order.45 The first dimension varies the incentive for participating in the
gamble, which is either high ($3) or low ($0.50). Hence, subjects in the low incentive condition
decide whether to take a win $0.50 / lose $3 gamble, and those in the high incentive condition
decide over a win $3 / lose $0.50 gamble; all see their options presented in this way.46
Before subjects decide whether to take the gamble, they can inform themselves whether
they will win or lose. They do so by examining a picture of 450 randomly arranged letters
as in Figure 4. Subjects know that if the lottery leads to a net gain, the picture contains 50
letters of G and 40 letters of B (for “good” and “bad”, respectively), and that these numbers
are reversed if the lottery leads to a loss. There is no time constraint. Hence, somebody willing
to put in the time and effort to count the letters can know with certainty whether taking the
gamble will lead to a gain or a loss.47
The second treatment dimension varies the point in time subjects learn the incentive for
taking the gamble. In the incentive first condition they first learns the incentive, and then view
the picture. In the picture first condition, this order is reversed. Before examining the picture,
45In addition to the four main treatments, each subject participates in two ancillary treatments that differ
from the main treatments only regarding how much money can be lost or won. See Appendix C.2 for details.
46This representation of payoffs, as opposed to presenting the incentive of $3 or $0.5 separately from the win
$0 / lose $3.50 gamble, aims to minimize confusion.
47For clarity, each picture was presented within a colored frame, and referred to by that color. For each
subject these colors were randomly assigned to rounds.
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subjects only learn that the net upside of the bet will be $3 or $0.5 with equal chance, and
that the net downside will be $3 or $0.5 with equal chance. Hence, incentives may influence
her information acquisition in the incentive first but not in the picture first condition.48
After deciding whether to take the gamble, subjects reveal their subjective posterior belief
that they have seen a good picture by selecting one of 12 bins, corresponding to 0, 5, 15,
25, . . . , 85, 95, or 100 percent certainty that the state in that round was good. This data
permits a comparison between objective and subjective beliefs, and thus a test of Bayesian
rationality. Truthtelling is incentivized by the binarized scoring rule (Hossain and Okui, 2013).49
At any point during the belief elicitation stage, subjects can return to the previous stage of the
experiment, for instance if the belief elicitation leads them to reassess their decision to take the
gamble.50
Relation to the model. The incentive first treatment directly maps to the model in Section
4 with parameters m ∈ {0.5, 3}, piG = 0, piB = −3.5 and µ = 0.5. The experiment does not
induce the information cost function c. Instead, it is naturally given by subjects’ disutility from
tediously examining the pictures of scrambled letters and their opportunity cost of time.
To see how incentives may affect information acquisition in the incentives first condition,
consider the example of a subject with a sequential information acquisition strategy like those
displayed in Figure 2. She scans through the picture, and keeps track of the number of Gs and
Bs she has encountered. She does so until she has either seen two more Gs than Bs, in which
case she takes the gamble; or until she has seen six more Bs than Gs, in which case she rejects.
This subject’s criterion for accepting the gamble is less stringent and thus more likely to be
satisfied by chance than that for rejecting the gamble. Hence, she will more likely commit a
false positive error than a false negative error. By choosing different criteria of when to stop
searching and accept or reject the gamble, she can change the false positive and false negative
probabilities. Such a decision rule can depend on the incentive amount only in the incentive
first but not in the picture first condition.
48Caplin and Dean (2013a,b) use a similar method of presenting information. Babcock and Loewenstein
(1997) and Gneezy et al. (2015) use a similar treatment variation to prevent the dependence of information
acquisition and interpretation on situational factors.
49This rule is incentive compatible regardless of the shape of a subject’s utility for money, as long as preferences
are linear in probabilities. Briefly, an agent is incentivized for his report r about his subjective probability of
an event A as follows: The computer independently draws probability q from a uniform distribution. If q > r,
the agent receives a prize with probability q. If q ≤ r, the agent receives the prize if event A occurs. Since
subjective probabilities are elicited in bins, I use the midpoint of each bin to determine payments; subjects were
informed of this fact.
50For readers nonetheless concerned that elicited beliefs are merely an ex post rationalization of the betting
decision, I test and reject this hypothesis in Appendix C.1.
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Payment. Participants are paid for one randomly selected decision of one randomly selected
round and thus have an incentive to reveal their genuine preferences in each decision. Subjects
are aware that they will be paid according to a betting decision with 80% probability, and
according to a belief elicitation decision with 20% probability. The larger weight placed on
the betting decision serves to increase the effect of the incentive condition on information
acquisition. Losses are discounted from a completion payment of $6; gains are added. On
average, subjects took 33 minutes to complete the study.51
Implementation. I conducted this experiment on the Amazon Mechanical Turk online labor
market with 450 subjects in March and October of 2015 and with an additional 503 subjects in
April of 2016.52 Laborers on that platform typically earn an hourly wage of around $5 (Horton,
Rand and Zeckhauser, 2011; Mason and Suri, 2012). All instructions were presented on screen.
Subjects were allowed to proceed only if they answered each of eleven simultaneous True/False
statements about the instructions correctly.53
Each subject participated in each treatment once, in individually randomized order. For
each subject and each decision, a state of the world was drawn according to the uniform prior
probability, and a new picture of scrambled letters corresponding to that state was randomly
generated. To prevent subjects in the picture first condition from allowing incentives to skew
their attention allocation, subjects could not return to the picture once they had decided to
continue.54
5.2 Analysis
I first test propositions 1 and 2 by analyzing the effect of incentives on state-contingent choice
probabilities and distribution of posterior beliefs, respectively. I then test for rationality by
comparing objective to subjective posterior beliefs. Throughout, I use the picture first treat-
ment as a control. This allows me to isolate the effect of the incentive amount on information
acquisition alone.
51The time spent examining a picture is right-skewed, with a mean of 59 seconds per picture, and a median
of 30 seconds. Response times are also highly dispersed, with a standard deviation of 87 seconds.
52Data on subjective beliefs are available for the April session only. The former sessions employed a version
of the quadratic scoring rule which was unsuitable due to its sensitivity to risk non-neutrality.
53If a subjects answers incorrectly, she only learns that at least one of the statements is marked incorrectly.
Hence, it is highly unlikely that participants can successfully complete this task by chance. The instructions
and test questions are reproduced in Appendix D.
54Subjects could not use a text editor to automatically count the letters because they were presented in a
picture format (HTML5 Canvas). In principle, subjects could have taken screenshots to refer back to the picture
after incentives are revealed in the picture first condition. If they did, my results would underestimate the effect
of endogenous attention allocation.
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Figure 4: Presentation of information about the state. In case the subject will win upon
taking the gamble, the picture has 50 letters G and 40 letters B. In case the subject will lose,
it has 40 letters G and 50 letters B.
State-contingent participation probabilities. Table 4 displays the fraction of subjects
who take the gamble if the state is bad (Panel A1) and if the state is good (Panel A2), separately
for each information condition. These numbers are the fractions of false positive and correct
positive choices, and allow for a test of Proposition 1, .
Focusing on Panel A1, we see that the raising the incentive increases participation in the bad
state by 44.81 percentage points in the incentive first condition, though by a significantly smaller
32.44 percentage points in the picture first condition. Hence, through its effect on information
acquisition, the rise in the incentive increases the false positive rate by 12.38 percentage points.
Panel A2 shows a similar result. With a higher incentive, participation in the good state
increases by 53.27 percentage points in the incentive first condition, though by a significantly
smaller 45.21 percentage points in the picture first condition. Hence, through its effect on
information acquisition, the rise in the incentive lowers the false negative rate by 8.05 percentage
points.
Averaging across the two states yields the supply curves, as shown in Panel A3, and plotted
in Panel A of Figure 5. The supply response to the increased incentive is 9.44 percentage points
larger when information acquisition can depend on the incentive (the incentive first condition)
than when it cannot (the picture first condition). This replicates the corresponding result from
the insect experiment.55
55In the current experiment, the model unambiguously predicts a stronger supply response in the incentive
first than in the picture first condition (see Appendix B.2 for a formal derivation). By contrast, the model is
merely consistent with the corresponding result in the insect experiment, but would also be consistent with the
opposite. The reason for this is that, in the insect experiment, subjects in the no video condition have access to
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A. State-contingent choice probabilities P (action|state)
A1. False positives A2. Correct positives A3. Supply curves
State Bad only Good only Both
Incentive $0.50 $3 Difference $0.50 $3 Difference $0.50 $3 Difference
Condition
Incentive first 7.93 52.75 44.81*** 36.29 89.56 53.27*** 22.11 71.15 49.04***
(1.24) (2.39) (2.68) (2.21) (1.35) (2.58) (1.35) (1.50) (2.13)
Picture first 12.29 44.74 32.44*** 41.87 87.08 45.21*** 26.89 66.50 39.61***
(1.60) (2.55) (3.00) (2.55) (1.64) (3.05) (1.59) (1.68) (2.40)
Difference -4.36** 8.02** 12.38*** -5.58* 2.47 8.05** -4.78** 4.66** 9.44***
(1.90) (3.21) (3.77) (3.01) (2.00) (3.66) (1.86) (2.14) (2.89)
B. Posterior probabilities P (state|action)
Action B1. Bet taken B2. Bet refused
Incentive $0.50 $3 Difference $0.50 $3 Difference
Condition
Incentive first 82.06 62.93 -19.13*** 40.90 18.10 -22.80***
(2.64) (1.89) (3.20) (1.81) (2.27) (2.79)
Picture first 77.96 66.40 -11.56*** 39.64 18.67 -20.98***
(2.58) (1.89) (3.10) (1.86) (2.16) (2.76)
Difference 4.10 -3.46 -7.57* 1.26 -0.56 -1.82
(3.60) (2.56) (4.53) (2.54) (0.30) (3.93)
Table 4: Panels A1 - A3 display (state-contingent) participation probabilities P (action|state).
A1 and A2 separately show participation rates in the bad and good states, respectively. A3
pools across states. They feature 1923, 1889, and 3502 observations from 893, 892, and 953
subjects, respectively. Panels B1 and B2 display posteriors P (state|action), based on 3502
observations from 953 subjects. In each regression that includes both states, exactly half the
total weight is given to good-state observations, and half to bad-state observations. Standard
errors are clustered by subject. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively. Asterisks are suppressed for levels.
Objective posteriors. To test Proposition 2, Panels B1 and B2 of Table 4 show, for each
treatment, the fraction of subjects who had seen a good-state picture, conditional on the action
they have taken. These numbers are estimates of the Bayesian posterior P (s = G|action). They
exactly coincide with the result one would obtain by applying Bayes’ law to the state-contingent
participation probabilities in Panel A.
a different opportunity set of information structures than those in the video condition, whereas in the present
experiment, subjects in both the incentive first and picture first condition face the same opportunity set of
information structures.
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Focusing on subjects who chose to gamble (Panel B1) in the picture first condition, we see
that the posterior at which subjects decide to participate is 11.56 percentage points lower if
the incentive is high. In the incentive first condition, by contrast, this number is 19.13. The
7.57 percentage point difference in these effect sizes confirms the prediction of Proposition 2—
with higher incentives, subjects participate at lower posteriors because they acquire different
information.
By contrast, for subjects who decided against the gamble (Panel B2), the difference between
the incentive first and picture first conditions is considerably attenuated and statistically in-
significant. In this experiment, subjects’ thresholds for accepting the gamble respond more to
changes in incentives than those for rejecting it. While this comparative static is not predicted
by the model, it is consistent with the literature on opportunity cost neglect (Frederick et al.,
2009).
Subjective posterior beliefs and rationality. Finally, I test for Bayesian rationality by
comparing elicited posteriors to an objective benchmark, in the following two ways.
First, I examine whether elicited posterior beliefs satisfy the law of iterated expectations.
Formally, this law states that a Bayesian’s expected posterior must equal his prior. Intu-
itively, a Bayesian may not expect to become more optimistic, on average, after observing
information—if he did, he should be more optimistic already. Because this law holds regardless
of the information structure a Bayesian chooses to observe, it is well applicable in the current
experiment.
Panel B of Figure 5 displays mean elicited posteriors in the incentive first condition.56 It
exceeds the prior of 50% by 4.53 percentage points (s.e. 1.35) if the incentive is high, and falls
short of it by 3.55 percentage points (s.e. 1.25) if the incentive is low. Hence, an increase
in the incentive makes subjects more optimistic in a fashion that violates the law of iterated
expectations and thus Bayesian rationality. This effect, however, does not significantly differ
across information conditions.57 Hence, while higher incentives do make subjects systematically
more optimistic, this is not because of the way they affect information acquisition. Moreover,
while the magnitude of the deviation from rationality is statistically significant, its magnitude
is limited.
Second, I compare elicited and Bayesian posteriors on a disaggregated level. A subject’s
reported posterior p coincides with the Bayesian posterior if the objective probability that this
565.47% of participants revised their decision about the bet during the belief elicitation stage in at least
one round. They did so infrequently; only 1.01% of all decisions are changed. Due to a coding error, these
decisions were not recorded in the October 2015 session; the reported numbers are based on the remaining 658
participants.
57The respective mean posteriors in the picture first condition are 46.48% (s.e. 1.32) if the incentive is low,
and 53.44% (s.e. 1.31) if it is high.
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Figure 5: Choice probabilities and posterior beliefs that the state is good. Panel A displays
the fraction of subjects accepting the gamble by treatment condition. Panel B shows mean
elicited posterior beliefs in the incentive first condition and compares them to the Bayesian
benchmark.
subject has seen a good-state picture is p. To operationalize this idea empirically, I fix a level
of elicited posterior belief p and count the number of times the state has actually been good
amongst all subjects who report that posterior.
Figure 6 shows that elicited posteriors track objective posteriors surprisingly closely (data
are averaged across all treatments). Amongst subjects who, for instance, report subjective
posteriors of 65%, I find 67.7% actually saw a good-state picture; and a similar result holds
for many other elicited posteriors. Deviations rarely exceed a handful of percentage points and
statistically significant differences are rare.58 This extent of rationality is particularly striking
in light of previous research on belief updating with exogenously given information, both in
the heuristics-and-biases tradition (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and in the man-as-intuitive-
statistician tradition (Peterson and Beach, 1967).59
58The fact that elicited and objective posteriors are close even though different incentives substantially change
their distribution suggests that subjects are well aware of the effect of incentives on information acquisition and
beliefs. In the insect experiment, by contrast, subjects are unable to predict how incentives affect reservation
prices when endogenous information acquisition is possible. While there are numerous differences between the
two experiments, a plausible candidate explanation for the difference is the following. In the present experiment,
a subject knows the total number of letters in a picture, and is therefore aware of the fraction of potentially
available information she has consulted. In the insect experiment, by contrast, it is less plausible that subjects
have an idea about how much could potentially be known about insects as food. It is thus difficult to know
what fraction of the total available information one has consulted, what reasoning one would have engaged in
in the absence of that information, and how one’s beliefs would change upon the arrival of information one does
not yet have. Consequently, in the insect experiment, it is likely harder to be well-aware of the precise effect of
incentives on one’s beliefs.
59A possible explanation for this difference is that typical belief updating experiments provide subjects with
numerical values describing a vector of state-contingent error probabilities. No such description is needed in the
present experiment. Deviations from Bayesianism in the literature might be due to difficulties with internalizing
numerical values, rather than with a failure to manipulate values correctly once subjects have internalized them.
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Figure 6: Elicited and objective posteriors. This figure plots estimates of the Bayesian pos-
terior for each level of elicited posterior. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Standard
errors are clustered by subject.
Hence, while deviations from Bayesian rationality in this experiment with endogenous in-
formation acquisition take the direction that ethicists and policy makers worry about, these
deviations are limited in magnitude. In particular, within the context of this experiment, a
higher incentive does make subjects ex ante better off, in spite of the observed deviations from
rationality.
6 Policy implications and further applications
Policies for transactions with currently restricted incentives. If one endorses a welfare
functional that prescribes limiting the effects of incentives on information acquisition described
in this paper, what are appropriate policies to do so?60
Two classes of policies can curtail the effects of incentives documented in this paper with-
out restricting incentives. One class focuses on increasing the information people possess when
deciding whether or not to enter a transaction, while the other class deals with compensating
undesirable outcomes ex post. Information can be increased in two ways. First, policy can sim-
ply obligate people to be well-informed before they participate, for instance through stringent
60There are concerns with incentives for certain transactions that do not relate to the acquisition and in-
terpretation of information. An important idea is that incentives may hurt individuals with time-inconsistent
preferences (Frederick, Loewenstein and o’Donoghue, 2002). Such concerns can be addressed by cooling-off pe-
riods (Becker and Elias, 2007) or by making the disbursement of incentive payments coincide with the incidence
of the utility costs of participating in the transaction over time.
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informed consent requirements.61 In some cases, such as gestational surrogacy, participation
can be limited to those who have undergone a similar experience before, and can thus better
predict the consequences of participation. For example, commercial surrogate motherhood is
legal in Russia, but only for women who have a child of their own (Svitnev, 2010). Second,
policy can decrease the information acquisition costs, for instance by making information more
easily accessible.
The second approach focuses on compensating participants for ex post undesirable outcomes.
In principle, this may reduce the difficult equity-efficiency tradeoff outlined in Section 4.4 into
a simpler question of efficiency maximization. Such a policy, however, faces at least three
obstacles. First, ex post undesirable outcomes are the reason why subjects acquire costly
information about a transaction. A policy that insures against such outcomes therefore dilutes
incentives for information acquisition, a form of moral hazard discussed below. Second, welfare
losses from undesirable ex post outcomes may not be perfectly observable, and incentivizing
truthful revelation is hardly possible after the fact. Hence, determining adequate compensation
and eligibility may be difficult.62 Third, a significant part of the ethics literature maintains
that it is fundamentally impossible to compensate people for the loss of certain goods such as
bodily integrity (Anderson, 1995; Sandel, 2012; Sen, 1985, 1999; Nussbaum, 1995).
Further applications Informational moral hazard. Insuring participants against adverse
outcomes is a frequently discussed policy in domains such as living kidney donation (Rosenberg,
2015a; Eyal et al., 2014). This paper suggests the potential side effect of insurance increasing the
fraction of participants who choose to participate but later regret this decision. This is because
a Bayes-rational agent acquires costly information in order to avoid false positives. Insurance
against undesirable outcomes decreases the cost of false positives, and thus the incentive for
information acquisition.63 Unlike moral hazard that arises, for instance, when car insurance
leads to careless driving, informational moral hazard can be mitigated by providing better
information to the insured.
61The ethics literature supports such requirements (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986). Also the respondents in
Ambuehl and Ockenfels (2017) overwhelmingly support interventions to maintain adherence to the principle of
informed consent. In the specific domain of living kidney donation, current informed consent practices are imper-
fect (Thiessen et al., 2013). Informed consent documents often do not supply all required pieces of information,
and are highly variable in items as crucial as complications related to surgery, health problems following surgery,
and payment for routine follow-up care. Moreover, informed consent for living kidney donors is currently thin
on psychological and emotional preparedness. Prospective living donors spend 45 minutes with a social worker
or other mental health professional and equal time with a living donor advocate (livingdonor101.com, 2013).
62See Mitchell and Moro (2006) for a related issue regarding compensating those who lose from trade liberal-
ization.
63A related literature starting with Doherty and Thistle (1996) considers how endogenous information acqui-
sition interacts with adverse selection. That literature abstracts from the kind of moral hazard that arises due
to endogenous information acquisition.
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Incentives and expert opinion. Most fundamentally, this paper shows that if a person has
incentives for entertaining certain beliefs, then that person will adjust his or her acquisition and
interpretation of information accordingly. This finding has implications for many situations in
which experts charged with acquiring and interpreting information are subject to incentives.
In the domain of personal finance, for instance, Linnainmaa, Melzer and Previtero (2016)
present evidence that financial advisors’ personal investment portfolios are often shaped by the
same misguided investment strategies they recommend to their clients. For advisers who are
incentivized to promote particular products and services, the present paper suggests that they
will search for and interpret information in a way that supports giving this advice. Because
this is driven by information acquisition, and potentially entirely rational, incentivized experts
will harbor correspondingly skewed beliefs themselves, and follow their own biased advice. In
a similar vein, this paper suggests that lobbying does not merely change how politicians vote;
through its power to influence how people acquire and interpret information, incentives also
re-shape their sincere beliefs about policies. The same mechanism provides further explanation
as to why pharmaceutical gifts to doctors may be effective (Campbell et al., 2007; Morgan et
al., 2006; Wazana, 2000). It also explains why even perfectly honest accountants may find it in
their interest to allocate their scarce resources such as time and funds in a way that ultimately
leads to skewed reporting (Bazerman et al., 2002).
7 Conclusion
This paper shows that incentives skew how people inform themselves about a transaction,
and thus reshapes their belief about what the the deliverable entails, in a way that causally
influences the decision they ultimately make. By shaping people’s beliefs about their choice
options, incentives thus genuinely persuade.
These mechanisms apply whenever incentives coincide with costly information acquisition,
and are thus potentially relevant in many subfields of economics. The finding has a particular
relevance regarding the many laws and regulations that restrict the nature and extent of incen-
tives to participate in transactions like organ donation, gestational surrogacy, and medical trial
participation, among others. An important motivation for such laws is the idea that incentives
lead to poor decision making. This paper shows that incentives indeed change behavior in a way
which, at first glance, may appear worrisome. A model of costly information acquisition shows,
however, that even perfectly Bayes-rational agents would act in the same fashion. The model
thus advances two objectives. First, it clarifies the conditions on the welfare functional under
which rational behavior may or may not justifiably be regarded as concerning. The extent to
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which one considers the ex post distribution of outcomes welfare-relevant plays a crucial role.
Second, it precisely delineates the type of empirical findings that are, and are not, evidence for
bad decision making.
There are reasons other than those addressed in this paper for which ethicists disapprove
of incentives for particular transactions. Most closely related to the economics literature is
the concern that incentives may hurt individuals with time-inconsistent preferences (Freder-
ick, Loewenstein and o’Donoghue, 2002). Such concerns are important, and can be addressed
separately from those studied in this paper.64 Conversely, incentives do not always raise con-
cerns, even when they coincide with costly information acquisition, such that the mechanisms
identified in this paper potentially apply.65 It appears that concerns are more frequent for
transactions in which there is a chance of significantly damaging an individual’s well-being,
with consequences that may be very difficult to reverse. In other cases, potential negative
effects of participation may be limited, and, accordingly, so are ethical concerns.
Most broadly, this paper bridges a gap between economics on the one hand, and the applied
ethics and policy literatures on the other. Through standard economic methodology, this
paper informs a prominent and highly influential, but vaguely formulated and largely untested
hypothesis about the effects of incentives. Generally, using the powerful toolbox of economics
to examine moral intuitions and the behavioral assumptions on which they rely is an important
direction for future research, for otherwise, our laws would be based on intuition and speculation
alone.
64Concerns about time-inconsistent preferences can be addressed, for instance, by cooling-off periods (Becker
and Elias, 2007) or by timing the disbursement of incentive payments such that they coincide with the incidence
of the utility costs of participating.
65One example is the decision to accept a new job in exchange for a higher salary.
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A Experiment 1: Additional Analysis
A.1 Randomization check
The four treatments are balanced across demographic characteristics. Table A.5 displays sum-
mary statistics of these variables by treatment. For each variable, the table reports the p-value
of an F -test for differences in the mean value of the variable across treatments. Of 24 tests
conducted, one is significant at the 5% level, and an additional three are significant at the 10%
level. This is within the expected range.
A.2 Choice consistency
A participants choices are inconsistent if she rejects a transaction at price p in the multiple
price list (MPL) in step 3 of the experiment, but accepts the same transaction in step 4, or vice
versa.1 Table A.6 details the fraction of each of these types of inconsistencies by treatment.
It shows that subjects in the low incentive treatments tend to state reservation prices that are
too high relative to their behavior in their $3-treatment decision. No such directional bias is
evident for subjects in the high incentive condition. This does not point to a difference across
treatments, as the decisions that reveal inconsistencies differ across the incentive treatments.
The fraction of inconsistent decisions is somewhat higher than is usually found in the litera-
ture on decision making under explicit risk, in which inconsistencies are identified by means of
multiple switching in a price list (e.g. Holt and Laury 2002). This may be because the decisions
that reveal inconsistencies in this experiment are temporally separated, whereas in the risky
decision making literature they are typically presented simultaneously.
Condition video no video
Incentive $3
Reservation price > $3 in MPL, accept $3 in treatment decision 15.03% 16.32%
Reservation price < $3 in MPL, reject $3 in treatment decision 1.42% 3.82%
Total 16.45% 20.15%
Incentive $30
Reservation price > $30 in MPL, accept $30 in treatment decision 4.24% 8.00%
Reservation price < $30 in MPL, reject $30 in treatment decision 5.71% 6.37%
Total 9.95% 14.37%
Table A.6: Choice inconsistencies across steps 3 and 4 of the experiment.
1The choices subjects’ made in step 6 of the experiment cannot reveal any inconsistencies, as they are made
with different information about the transaction than the treatment decisions in step 4.
1
Treatment condition
Incentive $30 $3 $30 $3
Video Yes Yes No No
Variable Mean p-value
Male 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.54 1.00
Age 21.43 22.01 21.37 21.30 0.34
Ethnicity
African-American 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.70
Caucasian 0.57 0.51 0.59 0.56 0.28
East Asian 0.19 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.22
Hispanic 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.99
Indian 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.56
Other 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.70
Monthly spending in USD 251.72 301.40 289.07 288.42 0.44
Year of studya 3.50 3.60 3.61 3.47 0.32
Graduate student 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.07
Field of study
Arts and humanities 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.04
Business or economics 0.27 0.36 0.34 0.43 0.09
Engineering 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.49
Science 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.47
Social science (excluding business and economics) 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.59
Political orientationb 0.50 0.32 0.27 0.09 0.08
Raven’s scorec 14.77 14.76 14.69 14.68 1.00
CRT scored 3.76 3.80 3.50 3.22 0.08
Experience with insects as food
Has intentionally eaten insects before 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.71
Grown up in culture that practices entomophagy 1.30 1.27 1.25 1.31 0.92
Grown up eating mostly western foods 0.81 0.73 0.82 0.78 0.06
Had a pet that fed on store-bought insects 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.26 0.68
Knew that this study concerns insect eating 2.64 2.46 2.54 2.49 0.31
Table A.5: Summary statistics and randomization check. The last column displays the
p-value of the test of joint significance of a regression of the indicated variable on treatment
dummies.
aYear of study only includes undergraduate students.
bPolitical orientation is measured on a scale of -2 (conservative) to 2 (liberal).
cRaven’s score is measured on a scale of 0 to 24.
dCRT score refers to performance on the extended version of the test (Toplak et al., 2014) and is measured
on a scale of 0 to 6.
A.3 Estimating reservation prices
In section 3.2, I report the estimates of the second stage of a double hurdle model. Here, I
describe the estimating equation, present the full set of estimated coefficients, and test the
2
restriction that the coefficients in the selection and amount equations are equal (as the Tobit
model imposes).
Double hurdle model There are n subjects, each of whom provide measures of reservation
prices for T species each. I use rit to denote individual i’s reservation price for species t and
set yit = 60− rit ($60 is the highest price offered in any decision in this experiment). The two
hurdles are defined as follows:
1. Participation decision (first hurdle)
d∗i = z
′
iα+ 1,i
di =
1 if d
∗
i > 0
0 otherwise
2. Amount decision (second hurdle)
y∗∗it = x
′
itβ + ui + 2,it
y∗it = max(y
∗∗
it , 0)
The vector of error terms (1,i, ui, 2,i) is normally distributed with mean zero, and variance-
covariance matrix
Σ =

1 ρσu 0
ρσu σ
2
u 0
0 0 σ2

The observed variable is yit = diy
∗
it. The second hurdle contains a subject-specific random-
effect term ui that allows between-subject heterogeneity.
Implementation I estimate this model using the user-written Stata command xtdhreg by
Engel and Moffatt (2014). I estimate two specifications. In the first, I include demographic
controls (gender, ethnicity, age, age2) as well as university and species dummies in the amount
equation. I also allow for correlation in the error terms across the hurdles (that is, ρ is endoge-
nous).
The results from this specification are reported in the main text. In the second, I do
not include any controls, and in the third I include only the demographic controls. I also
demonstrate that a double hurdle model is the appropriate specification. Do do so, for each of
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the two specifications I also estimate a version in which I impose the restriction the Tobit model
makes, namely that the treatments affect the participation decision and the amount decision in
the same way. Formally, I require αk = βk for all variables k that are included in both xi and
zi. For each of the specifications, I use a likelihood ratio test to test that restriction. Finally, I
also estimate a specification including further controls (see section A.7 for details).
Results Table A.7 displays the results. A comparison of Columns 1 and 3 shows that the
estimates are not significantly affected by the inclusion of demographic control variables, and
one of Columns 1 and 5 shows that the qualitative results are not substantially affected by the
inclusion of university and species fixed effects. Comparing Columns 1 and 7 further reveals
that the adding further control variables to the amount equation does not substantially change
any qualitative results either.
For the first, second, and third specification, the value of the likelihood ratio test statistic is
14.54, 12.88 and 11.74, respectively. Each exceeds the 5%-critical value of the χ2(4) distribution
of 9.49. Hence, the restricted versions are rejected in favor of the unrestricted ones. The
interpretation is that subjects who do not consume any insect for any price in this experiment
are differently affected by the treatment interventions than the remaining subjects, as one
would expect given the treatment incentives of $3 and $30 are less than half of those subjects’
reservation prices.
A.4 Awareness
I obtain the results on subjects’ awareness of self-persuasion discussed in Section 3.3 by esti-
mating the following regression model, separately for subjects in the video condition and for
subjects in the no video condition. (Recall that subjects in the video (no video) condition
predicted the reservation price of other subjects in the video (no video) only.)
ŴTA
i
cs = β0 + β11(incentivei = high) + β21(c = high) + 
i
cs (3)
Here, ŴTA
i
cs is subject i’s prediction of the the mean reservation price of subjects in incentive
condition c for species s. In words, I regress subject i’s prediction about others’ reservation
price on a dummy that indicates whether the prediction concerns a previous subject facing
c = $3 or c = $30 low incentives. Hence, β2 is the amount by which subjects’ predict incentives
change reservation prices for others. I let the intercept vary depending on whether the subject
making the prediction was herself offered the high or the low incentives.
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I compare subjects’ predictions of the effect of incentives on reservation prices to their actual
effect. To simplify the comparison, I estimate the following linear model.
WTAis = γ0 + γ11(incentivei = high) + η
i
s (4)
I jointly estimate equations (3) and (4), jointly across both video conditions. I control for
gender, ethnicity, age and age2, and include university and species fixed effects.
Column 1 of table A.8 displays the estimated parameters of equation (3) for subjects in
the no video condition. It shows that these subjects predicted that other subjects in the no
video condition would demand an additional $4.07 to eat an insect when offered the high rather
than the low incentive. Column 2 displays the estimate of the effect of incentives on actual
reservation prices, and shows an effect of $4.45. Subjects’ predictions deviate from the measured
effect of $4.45 by a statistically and economically insignificant $0.37.
Columns 3 and 4 show the respective data for the video condition. Subjects predict that
the effect of incentives on other subjects in the video condition is $5.16, and thus predict the
anchoring effect of $4.45 (as measured in the no video condition) with reasonable accuracy. In
reality, however, that effect is countervailed by a sizable self-persuasion effect. These two effects
sum to a negative $0.55. Hence, the predictions of subjects in the video treatment are wildly
off, by a highly significant $5.70. On average, subjects lack awareness of the self-persuasion
effect.
Even though subjects do not predict the self-persuasion effect, their predictions are affected
by it. Apparently, subjects who have both an incentive and the opportunity to persuade
themselves do so. But because they lack awareness of this effect, they project their own lower
willingness to accept onto others. Column 3 of Table A.8 shows that amongst subjects in the
video condition, those who were given the high incentive predict significantly lower reservation
prices for others. For those who could not see a video, this effect is just 40% as large, and not
statistically significant.
Subjects’ beliefs about the effect of incentives on others are heterogenous. Roughly one third
of subjects predict that higher incentives decrease reservation prices, and roughly two-thirds
predict the opposite. These fractions does not substantively differ across the four treatment
cells (p = 0.79, test for joint significance of treatment dummies). Hence, while the above results
show that subjects on average fail to predict the self-persuasion effect, it is still possible, for
instance, that subjects who are themselves more prone to self-persuasion are more likely to
predict a negative effect of incentives on reservation prices. To address this issue, I split the
sample into those who predict that incentives lower reservation prices, and those who predict
the opposite. I can do so because each subject separately predicted the reservation prices of
6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
no video video
Dependent variable Reservation price Reservation price
predicted actual predicted actual
Level with $3 incentive 20.35 22.31 18.76 20.63
(2.16) (2.22) (1.22) (1.37)
Effect of increase in incentive 4.07*** 4.53* 5.16*** - 0.63
(0.72) (2.55) (0.63) (2.05)
Effect of predictor’s own incentive -0.95 - -2.72** -
on prediction (1.60) (1.34)
Difference predicted vs. actual -0.46 - 5.79*** -
effect of increase in incentive (2.65) (2.03)
Observations 2,710 1,355 3,520 1,921
Number of subjects 271 127 352 195
Table A.8: Demographic controls are gender, ethnicity, age and age2. Levels are displayed for
the mean participant. The first 48 participants at Stanford did not predict others’ reservation
prices, and are therefore not included in the regression in this table. Estimated using university
and species fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
previous participants in the high and low incentive conditions. These predictions cannot be an
ex-post rationalization of subjects’ own behavior, since each subject was in only one treatment.
Indeed, subjects who expect self-persuasion in others are indeed more prone to self-persuasions
themselves. Amongst the 24.25% of subjects in the video condition who believe that self-
persuasion outweighs anchoring, the increase in incentives indeed leads to a $5.83 decrease in
reservation prices. Amongst the 69.5% of subjects in the video condition with the opposite
beliefs, by contrast, the same increase in incentives leads to a $2.49 increase in reservation
prices. The difference between these effects is significant at the 10%-level. Hence, subjects are
partially aware of the effect of incentives on reservation prices.2
2Amongst subjects in the no video condition, 31% believe that self-persuasion outweighs anchoring, and
63.1% have the opposite beliefs. The effect of the increase in incentives on those subjects’ reservation prices are
$8.39 and $2.01, respectively. The p-value of the difference is p = 0.102.
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Low High Difference
Incentive Incentive High - Low
Information
no video 22.10 26.68 4.58*
(1.82) (1.81) (2.55)
video 19.64 16.99 -2.65
(1.72) (1.69) (2.35)
Difference -2.46 -9.69*** -7.23**
(2.42) (2.44) (3.43)
Table A.9: Reservation prices after distribution of insects, in dollars, estimated by the second
equation of the double hurdle model using 3,226 observations from n = 671 subjects. Standard
errors clustered by subjects. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively. Asterisks are suppressed for levels.
A.5 Reservation prices after distribution of insects
In step 5 of the experiment, subjects receive all the insects. This potentially changes reservation
prices, due to a multitude of factors. On the one hand, the additional information one can gather
by observing the insects is still imperfect about what it is like to ingest them, so that skewed
interpretation is still possible. On the other hand, the additional information might lead to
some convergence of beliefs towards the true disutility from consuming the insects. Moreover,
because the decision that will be carried out with the highest likelihood has already been made,
ex post rationalization may now affect behavior. Whatever the mechanism, table A.9 displays
the mean reservation prices after the distribution of the insects as estimated by the second
stage of the double hurdle model.3
A.6 Choice of video clips
Subjects in the video condition also select at least four out of a selection of 9 video clips,
grouped in bins of three named “Reasons for eating insects”, “Reasons against eating insects”,
“Other information about eating insects”. This reveals whether incentives affect the amount
of information demanded.
Subjects know that they will either watch the selected 6-minute video, or all the clips they
selected, but not both. They also know that the chance of the former is 97%. This probability
is chosen for reasons of statistical power. There are many possible selections of video clips, each
3I use the same set of control variables as in the main text. Other estimated parameters: σu = 19.25,
σ = 10.87. ρ = 0 is enforced, as the likelihood function is flat when this parameter is endogenous.
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of which could potentially differently affect behavior. By contrast, there are only two selections
of 6-minute videos, thus leading to a potentially more pronounced treatment effect.
Empirically, subjects’ choice of video clips reinforces the finding that incentives cause them
to demand information in a way that is more favorable to participation. Table A.10 shows
that subjects in the $30-condition select significantly fewer discouraging clips, and significantly
more encouraging clips, while the number of other clips is unaffected. Incentives do not affect
the total number of clips selected, because most subjects opt for the minimum number of four
clips.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of clips chosen
Encouraging Discouraging Other Total
Effect of higher incentive 0.17* -0.24** 0.01 -0.07
(0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
Levels
$30 incentive 2.29 0.99 1.15 4.42
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11)
$3 incentive 2.12 1.23 1.14 4.49
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09)
Observations 321 321 321 321
Table A.10: Video clips chosen by incentive condition. The number of observations is smaller
for the video clips than for the six minute video as the first 79 participants at Stanford could
not choose any clips. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. Asterisks are suppressed for levels.
A.7 Robustness checks
Video choice and participation probabilities Table A.12 reports estimates of alternative
regression specifications of the results on information choice and participation probabilities.
First, I estimate all results with a wider range of control variables. In addition to gender,
ethnicity, and age, I also control for monthly spending, score in the CRT test, score in the
IQ test, college major, as well as variables relating to experience with insects. The latter
are whether the subject has voluntarily eaten insects before, whether the subject has grown
up eating mostly western foods, and whether the subject has a background in a culture in
which entomophagy is common. Second, I estimate Probit and Logit specifications. (For these
regressions, I do not include university and species fixed effects, see Greene 2004.)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Choose encouraging video
Effect of high incentive 0.07* 0.07** 0.32** 0.35** 0.56* 0.58*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.16) (0.16) (0.29) (0.30)
Method OLS OLS Probit Probit Logit Logit
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
University FE Yes Yes No No No No
Species FE Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 2,000 2,000 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920
Subjects 400 400 384 384 384 384
Table A.11: Robustness checks for treatment effects on the probability of choosing the
encouraging rather than the discouraging video. Other controls are monthly spending, score in
the CRT test, score in the IQ test, college major, as well as variables relating to experience with
insects. The latter are whether the subject has voluntarily eaten insects before, whether the
subject has grown up eating mostly western foods, and whether the subject has a background
in a culture in which entomophagy is common. The number of observations for the probit and
logit models is reduced since for some realizations of control variables, the outcome is predicted
perfectly (for instance subjects identifying as neither male nor female). Column 1 replicates the
respective specification reported in the main text. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Accept transaction at promised incentive
Effect in no video 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.98*** 1.02***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.22)
Effect in video 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.91*** 0.93*** 1.48*** 1.55***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.12) (0.19) (0.20)
Difference in effects 0.10* 0.10* 0.31* 0.32* 0.51* 0.53*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.18) (0.18) (0.29) (0.29)
Method OLS OLS Probit Probit Logit Logit
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
University FE Yes Yes No No No No
Species FE Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 3,307 3,307 3,288 3,288 3,288 3,288
Subjects 671 671 667 667 667 667
Table A.12: Robustness checks for treatment effects on the supply curves. See Table A.12 for
explanation of variables. Column 1 replicates the respective specification reported in the main
text. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Reservation prices The estimates of reservation prices with the additional control variables
described in the previous paragraph are displayed in Column 5 of Table A.7. None of the results
are relevantly different.
In addition to the double hurdle specifications, I also use linear specifications, both with
and without additional statistical control variables, and interval regression. I estimate each of
these specifications twice. The first time, I only include the 90.61% complier subjects. These
are the subjects who accept at least one out of the 10 offers in the experiment to eat an insect
in exchange for $60. The second time, I also include the remaining 9.39% of subjects who
categorically refuse to eat insects, even for an amount that is twice the ‘high’ incentive of
$30. These subjects cannot reasonably be expected to be affected by the incentive treatment.
Because of their extreme reservation prices (set to $60 in the linear specifications), however,
their presence substantially lowers the statistical precision of the estimates.
Table A.13 reports the results. Considering first the results on the complier subjects alone,
these specifications replicate the significant interaction between the incentive and video condi-
tions, as in the main text. The estimated coefficient is attenuated in the linear specifications
that ignore the censoring issue (Columns 1 and 3). The inclusion of additional control variables
only marginally alters the estimated coefficients. Considering the results on the sample includ-
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ing all subjects we find coefficients that are slightly attenuated, and standard errors that are
slightly larger, as one would expect from adding what essentially amounts to noise to the data.
While the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the incentive and video condition
loses statistical significance, they remain largely similar in magnitude to the case in which only
complier subjects are included, across all three specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Reservation price
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS iReg iReg
Sample Compliers All Compliers All Compliers All
High incentive × video -6.55** -5.15 -5.94** -4.89 -7.36* -5.33
(3.11) (3.22) (3.00) (3.13) (3.79) (4.38)
High incentive 5.30** 4.56* 5.04** 4.52* 5.90** 4.68
(2.42) (2.49) (2.36) (2.44) (2.94) (3.42)
Video 1.05 -0.65 0.88 -0.59 1.14 -1.19
(2.16) (2.27) (2.15) (2.24) (2.65) (3.09)
Constant 11.09 17.27 14.66 19.31 9.16 15.81
(11.63) (12.60) (11.65) (12.69) (14.14) (16.67)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls No No Yes Yes No No
University dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Species dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,961 3,276 2,961 3,276 2,961 3,276
Subjects 608 671 608 671 608 671
Table A.13: Robustness checks for treatment effects on reservation prices. See Table A.12
for explanation of variables. iReg refers to interval regression. Standard errors clustered by
subject. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
A.8 Subjects who watched the encouraging video
Here I replicate Table 3 comparing subjects in the video condition who watched the encour-
aging video to subjects in the no video treatment. This provides supporting evidence for the
finding that incentives affect participation probabilities and reservation prices not only though
their effect on video choice, but also by changing how subjects interpret the information in
the encouraging video. These estimates need to be interpreted with caution, as they are sub-
ject to endogeneity and selection bias because the video a subject watched reflects a choice.
The estimated coefficients remain largely comparable to those I obtain when all subjects are
included.
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A. Supply curves B. Reservation prices
Incentive $3 $30 Difference $3 $30 Difference
Information
no video 37.08 59.43 22.34*** 20.11 24.90 4.79**
(3.39) (3.39) (4.77) (1.72) (1.86) (2.31)
video 40.94 74.38 33.44*** 17.64 17.58 -0.05
(3.41) (2.53) (4.21) (1.73) (1.45) (2.18)
Difference 3.86 14.95** 11.10* -2.47 -7.32*** - 4.85
(4.83) (4.31) (6.37) (2.25) (2.25) (3.23)
Table A.14: Replication of Table 3 including only subjects who either had chosen to watch the
encouraging video, or were in the control treatment. Standard errors clustered by subjects. *,
** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Asterisks
are suppressed for levels.
B Model: Additional Materials and Proofs
B.1 General state space
In this section, I show that the assumption of two states of the world made in section 4 is
inessential to the qualitative predictions of the model. I extend the model to a general state
space Ω ⊆ R. This allows a decision maker to learn not only about the likelihood that the
consequence of a transaction will be good or bad, but also the distribution of the magnitudes
of the gains and losses that can be incurred.
I still find that higher incentives increase the demand for information about the upside of
the transaction, and decrease the demand for information about the downside. I also find that
if the costs of information are proportional to Shannon mutual information, then an increase in
incentives increases the probability an agent ex post regrets participating conditional on having
participated. In addition, I show that posterior-separability of the cost of information function
(in the sense of Caplin and Dean (2013b)) is sufficient for higher incentives to increase the false
positive rate.
Setup An agent whose preferences are quasilinear in money can decide whether or not to
participate in a transaction. If he abstains, he receives utility 0. If he accepts, he receives a
monetary payment m ≥ 0, and stochastic, non-monetary utility u(ω) with u : Ω→ R increasing,
and u(0) = 0, where Ω is a measurable subset of R that represents the set of states of the
world. The agent is imperfectly informed about ω and thus about his utility from accepting
the transaction. His prior distribution of ω is given by a probability density function µ(ω).
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Before deciding whether or not to accept the transaction, the agent can obtain information
about ω. As in section 4, I directly model the agent as choosing state-dependent participation
probabilities pω = P (accept|ω). The cost of a vector of state dependent acceptance probabilities
(pω)ω is given by c
(
(pω)ω
) ∈ R. Hence, the setting differs from that in section 4 only to the
extent that the state space Ω is more general.
Analysis The agent’s utility from state dependent acceptance probabilities (pω)ω is
V = E [(ω +m)pω]− c
(
(pω)ω
)
(5)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the agent’s prior beliefs. To illustrate, notice that
with incentives m, a perfectly informed agent would accept if ω +m ≥ 0 and reject otherwise.
I consider an increase in the incentive for participation from m to m′ > m. In contrast to
the two-states model, such a change now does not only affect the costs of false positives and
false negatives, but also changes the set of states ω in which the agent would participate under
full information. Nonetheless, an increase in the incentive still leads to the substitution and
stakes effects outlined in section 4. On the one hand, higher incentives change the stakes of
the decision, and thus lead the agent to acquire a different amount of information. If it causes
the agent to purchase more information, he will increase pω for those ω in which accepting is
optimal, and decrease pω for the ω for which rejection is optimal. On the other hand, higher
incentives make false positives cheaper, and they make false negatives more expensive. Hence,
the agent will acquire a different kind of information; pω will increase for all ω, including
those for which rejection is optimal. Which of these effects outweighs depends on the cost of
information function. Figure B.7 illustrates.
As in the two-state model, posterior separability (Caplin and Dean, 2013b) of the cost of
information function is a sufficient condition for the substitution effect to outweigh (higher
incentives increase false positives). In the continuous case, it is given as follows. I write
p = E(pω) =
∫
pωµωdω for the unconditional probability that the agent participates if his
state-contingent participation probabilities are given by (pω)ω. Moreover, I write γ
ω
a =
pωµ
p for
the value of the posterior density at ω if the agent participates, and γωr =
(1−pω)µ
1−p if he abstains.
The cost function c is posterior separable if there exists a strictly convex function h : [0, 1]→ R
such that c can be written in the following form4
c
(
(pω)ω
)
= E [h(µ)]− pE [h(γωa )]− (1− p)E [h(γωr )]
4This is the Shannon mutual information cost function if h(x) = x log(x) + (1− x) log(1− x).
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Figure B.7: Effects of a change in incentives on the agents’ information with u(ω) = ω. The
figure plots, for each state of the world ω the probability that the agent accepts the offer given
his optimal information demand. With incentives m = 0, optimal information demand could,
for instance, lead to a schedule of acceptance probabilities P (accept|ω) depicted by the bold
line. An increase in incentives to m′ > m increase P (accept|ω) for all ω > −m, if the income
and stakes effects have the same direction. Depending on the cost of information function, the
stakes effect or the substitution effect may dominate for ω < −m′. These cases are illustrated
by the dashed and dot-dashed schedules, respectively. In case of a posterior-separable cost of
information function, the substitution effect dominates.
Part (i) of the following proposition formally shows that an increase in incentives increases
the false positive rate if the cost function is posterior separable. Specifically, for all ω < −m′,
the agent will ex-post regret if he participates if the state is ω. Because under posterior
separability all pω increase, this means that in particular the false positive probability increases.
Note also that posterior separability is also a sufficient condition for the required sign of the
cross-derivative in the special version of this model outlined in section 4.
To generalize proposition 2, note in the two-state model participation at a lower posterior
implies an increased probability that the agent ex post regrets participation conditional on
having participated. Part (ii) of the proposition below shows that this statement generalizes to
the continuous state if c is given by Shannon mutual information costs, and if the change in
the incentive amount has a sufficiently small effect on the measure of states in which a fully
informed agent would change his participation decision.
Proposition 3.
(i) If c is posterior separable, and if m′ > m, then for all ω ∈ Ω, pω(m′) ≥ pω(m).
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(ii) If c is proportional to Shannon mutual information, and P
(
ω ∈ [−m′,m]) is sufficiently
small, then an increase in incentives from m to m′ > m increases the probability the agent
regrets conditional on having participated.
B.2 Predictions for the experiment in section 5
The experiment in section 5 maps directly to the model in section 4. Here, I formally derive
the predictions I test with that experiment.
Slope of the supply curve Consider incentive amounts m¯ and m with −piB > m¯ > m > 0.
Consider two treatments. In the incentive first treatment, the agent first learns the incentive
m ∈ {m¯,m}, then gathers information, and finally decides whether to take the bet. In the
picture first treatment, the agent first only learns that the incentive will be m¯ or m with
probability α and (1−α), respectively. He then gathers information, then learns the realization
of m, and finally decides whether participate. I say that information is instrumental if the
agents’ betting decision depends on the realization of the informative signal.
Proposition 4. Suppose the cost-of-information function c has increasing differences. Let
pb(m) and pa(m) denote the ex ante participation probabilities in the two treatments if the
incentive is m. Suppose the chosen information is instrumental for both incentive amounts
in both the incentive first and the picture first condition. Then, pb(m¯) > pa(m¯) and pb(m) <
pa(m). In particular, the effect of incentives is stronger in the incentive first condition: pb(m¯)−
pb(m) > pa(m¯)− pa(m).
The proof is in section B.3. Intuitively, the result can easily be seen in Figure B.8. The
subjects’ objective function in the picture first condition regarding information acquisition is
simply αU(pG, pB ; m¯) + (1 − α)U(pG, pB ;m) = µpG(piG + mˆ) + (1 − µ)pB(piB + mˆ), where
mˆ = m¯ + m. Hence, the decision maker chooses the same information structure he would
choose if the incentive amount were equal to the expected incentive. This leads to a choice
of false positive and false negative probabilities that are between those he would choose if he
knew the realization of the incentive amount before acquiring information.
The condition of this proposition is that information is instrumental for both incentive
amounts in both information conditions. To see that it is satisfied empirically, compare panels B
and C of Table 4. For both incentive amounts in both information conditions, the participation
probability is higher by a factor of about 2 or more if the state is good than if it is is bad.
Hence, the information about the state does affect subjects’ participation probability.
If information acquisition cannot depend on the incentive, and the subject follows the signal,
this model predicts that the increase in the incentive has no effect at all. A variety of extensions
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allow incentives to affect participation in the picture first condition even if information is
instrumental. The most plausible one is that a fraction of subjects remember, perhaps vaguely,
the picture they have seen. Once they learn which incentive amount has realized, they mentally
revisit the picture, and decide whether to take the lottery. In this case, the picture first condition
does not entirely preclude incentive-dependent information acquisition. (A related possibility
is that some subjects take a screenshot, and further examine the picture once they know what
incentive has realized.)					
1 − !!	
!! 	
1	
1	
½		½		
A	
B	
C	
Figure B.8: Effects of having to choose an information structure before the incentive amount
is known. As in figure 3, points A and B represent optimal information demand with low (m)
and high (m¯) incentives, respectively. Point C represents the optimal information demand if
information is chosen knowing solely that the incentive amount will be m or m¯, each with equal
probability.
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B.3 Proofs
Proof of proposition 1
(i) For convenience, let qG = pB , qB = 1 − pB , and let q = (qG, qB). Without loss of
generality, we set m = 0 (piG and piB can be adjusted accordingly) and λ = 1. The agent
solves
max
q
µqGpiG + (1− µ)(1− qB)piB − c(q)
We derive the comparative statics regarding the payoffs piG, and piB . By the limit as-
sumptions on c, whenever the optimal solution involves a positive amount of information
acquisition, the optimal participation probabilities are interior. Since the cost function is
strictly convex, any interior solution q∗ to the maximization problem is characterized by
the first order condition µ 0
0 −(1− µ)
piG
piB
 = ∇c(q∗)
Let D2c = [ c11 c12c21 c22 ] denote the Hessian of the cost function. Then, totally differentiating
the foregoing condition yieldsµ 0
0 −(1− µ)
dpiG
dpiB
 = D2c(q∗)
dq∗G
dq∗B

We obtain dq∗s/dpis′ for s, s
′ ∈ {G,B} by setting either dpiB = 0 or dpiG = 0 and solv-
ing for the derivatives of interest. Specifically, left-multiplying the above expression by(
D2c(q∗)
)−1
, setting dpiB = 0 and dividing by dpiG yields
(
D2c(q∗)
)−1 µ 0
0 −(1− µ)
1
0
 =
dq∗G/dpiG
dq∗B/dpiG

If alternatively, we set dpiG = 0 and divide by dpiB , we obtain
(
D2c(q∗)
)−1 µ 0
0 −(1− µ)
0
1
 =
dq∗G/dpiB
dq∗B/dpiB

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Stacking these sidewards, and substituting the explicit expression for
(
D2c(q∗)
)−1
, we
thus obtain
dq∗
dpi
=
 dq∗GdpiG dq∗GdpiB
dq∗B
dpiG
dq∗B
dpiB
 = 1
det
(
D2c(q∗)
)
 µc22 (1− µ)c12
−µc21 −(1− µ)c11

By strict convexity of c, det
(
D2c(q∗)
)
> 0. By Schwarz’s theorem, c12 = c21, which,
by assumption, is positive. Hence, dpGdm =
dqG
dm =
µc22+(1−µ)c12
det(D2c(q∗)) > 0, and
dpB
dm = −dqBdm =
µc21+(1−µ)c11
det(D2c(q∗)) > 0, which directly implies the claim.
(ii) (This proof also applies to the continuous model. For the two-states case, write ω ∈ Ω =
{G,B}, with µG = µ and µB = 1− µ.)
The cost function c is posterior separable if there exists a strictly convex function h :
[0, 1]→ R such that c can be written as
c
(
(pω)ω
)
= pE [h(γωa )] + (1− p)E [h(γωr )]− E [h(µ)]
where γωa =
pωµ
p denotes the value of the posterior density at ω if the agent participates,
and γωr =
(1−pω)µ
1−p if he abstains, pω is the probability that he participates in state ω, and
p := E(pω). Here, all expectations are taken with respect to the prior distribution.
Differentiating the cost function with respect to pω, we get
∂c
∂pω
= µω [h(γ
ω
a ) + h(γ
ω
r )] + ph
′ (γa)
(
µω
p
− pωµ
2
ω
p2
)
+(1− p)h′(γωr )
( −µω
1− p +
(1− pω)µ2ω
(1− p)2
)
= µω [h(γ
ω
a ) + h(γ
ω
r )] + h
′ (γa)µω(1− γωa )− h′ (γr)µω(1− γωr ) (6)
where γ = (γa, γr) denotes the distribution of posterior beliefs. For ω
′ 6= ω, γωa and γωr
depend on pω′ only through p. Therefore, we have that
∂2c
∂pω∂pω′
= ∂
2c
∂pω∂p
∂p
∂pω′
= ∂
2c
∂pω∂p
µω′ ,
so that it suffices to show that ∂
2c
∂pω∂p
< 0. Indeed,
∂2c
∂pω∂p
= µωh
′′(γωa )(1− γωa )
∂γωa
∂p
− µωh′′(γωr )(1− γωr )
∂γωr
∂p
Since
∂γωa
∂p = −γ
ω
a
p and
∂γωr
∂p =
γωr
1−p , by the definition of γ
ω
a and γ
ω
r we obtain
∂2c
∂pω∂p
= −h′′(γωa )γωa (1− γωa )− h′′(γωr )γωr (1− γωr ).
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This is negative due to h′′ > 0 and γωa , γ
ω
r ∈ [0, 1] for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof of proposition 2 Consider the posterior separable cost function, c(pG, pB) = ph(γa)+
(1 − p)h(γr) − h(µ), for some strictly convex, twice differentiable function h : [0, 1] → R.
Due to posterior separability and due to the bijective relation between state contingent choice
probabilities (pG, pB) and posterior beliefs (γa, γr), the agent’s optimization problem can be
recast as
max
γa,γr
pNa + (1− p)Nr s.t. pγa + (1− p)γr = µ, γa ≥ µ, γr ≤ µ (7)
where
Nr = 0− λh(γr)
Na = γa(piG +m) + (1− γa)(piB +m)− λh(γa)
and where the first constraint is the law of iterated expectations.
Caplin and Dean (2013b) refer to Na and Nr are the net utilities of each act. They show
that the solution to (7) is given by the posteriors γa and γr that support the concavification of
the upper envelope of the net utility functions, akin to the well-known result by Gentzkow and
Kamenica (2011).
To find γa and γr that support the concavification, we derive the tangent to Nr at γr and
the tangent to Na at the belief γa. First, insisting that the slopes of the tangents coincide yields
−λh′(γr) = ∆− λh′(γa) (8)
Second, we require that the levels of the tangents are equal at the level of belief γ˜ that renders
the agent just indifferent between participating and abstaining (i.e. γ˜ satisfies 0 = γ˜piG + (1−
γ˜)piB +m). Writing, for ease of notation, ∆ = piG − piB , we thus obtain:
−λh(γr) = ∆(γa − γ˜)− λh(γa) + (γa − γr)λh′(γr) (9)
We now show that ∂γr∂m has the same sign as
∂γa
∂m . To do so, we differentiate (9) with respect
to m. This yields −λh′′(γr)∂γr∂m = −λh′′(γa)∂γa∂m . Hence the statement follows from the fact
that h′′(γ) > 0 for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. Taking the derivative of (9) with respect to m then shows that
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∂γa
∂m < 0, as follows. The derivative is
−λh′(γr)∂γr
∂m
= ∆
(
∂γa
∂m
− ∂γ˜
∂m
)
− λh′(γa)∂γa
∂m
+
(
∂γa
∂m
− ∂γr
∂m
)
λh′(γr) + (γa − γr)λh′′(γr)∂γr
∂m
This simplifies to
0 =
∂γa
∂m
(
∆− λh′(γa) + λh′(γr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0, by (9)
+(γa − γr)λh′′(γa)
)−∆ ∂γ˜
∂m
Since ∂γ˜∂m < 0 and (γa − γr)λh′′(γa) > 0 , we thus have that ∂γa∂m < 0.
Proof of proposition 4 The incentive is m¯ with probability α and m with probability
1− α, with m¯ > m. Since U(pG, pB ;m) is linear in m, the agent’s expected utility from state-
contingent acceptance-probabilities (pG, pB) is U(pG, pB ;αm¯+(1−α)m)−λc(pG, 1−pB). This
has increasing differences in (pG, 1−pB , α) because U(pG, pB ;m)−λc(pG, 1−pB) has increasing
differences in (pG, 1− pB ,m). Consequentially, by Topkis’ theorem, (pG, pB) is increasing in α.
Hence, the fraction of participants, given by p = µpG + (1− µ)pB , is therefore also increasing
in α.
Proof of proposition 3
(i) I use Topkis’ theorem to prove the claim. The agent maximizes expression (5) by choosing
the family of state-contingent participation probabilities (pω)ω. We must show that the
objective function has increasing differences both in (pω, pω′) and in (pω,m) for all ω, ω
′ ∈
Ω. As m enters the objective function additively, the latter is trivially true. Because the
objective function is non-linear in (pω, pω′) only through the cost function c, it is sufficient
to show that c has decreasing differences in (pω, pω′). This is shown in the proof to part
(ii) of proposition 1 above.
(ii) A direct application of theorem 1 in Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) shows that for all ω ∈ Ω,
the state-contingent acceptance probabilities pω are given by
pω =
[
1 +
(
1
p
− 1
)
exp
{
− 1
λ
ω
}]−1
(10)
where p is the ex ante participation probability, p = E(pω).
I assume P
(
ω ∈ [−m′′,−m]) = 0 for some m′′ > m′. (this condition is satisfied in the two-
state model of section 4 by the assumption that piG+m
′ > piG+m > 0 > piB+m′ > piB+
m). The extension to the case in which P
(
ω ∈ [−m′′,−m]) is sufficiently small follows by
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continuity. Moreover, without loss of generality, I set m = 0 (the prior distribution µ can
be changed accordingly). We have P (regret|participate) = P (ω+m′ ≤ 0 |participate ) =∫ −m′
−∞
pω
p dµ(ω). By equation (10) and the assumption that P
(
ω ∈ [−m′′,−m]) = 0, this
is equivalent to
P (regret|participate) =
∫ −m′′
−∞
1
p+ (1− p) exp [−ω+m′λ ]dµ(ω)
The denominator is decreasing in m′ and decreasing in p (the latter is true because the
integral is taken only over ω for which ω < −m′, so that exp
[
−ω+m′λ
]
> 1). By the proof
of part (i) of this proposition, an increase in m′ increases pω for all ω. Hence, it increases
p. Consequently, a marginal increase in m′ increases P (regret|participate), as was to be
shown.
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C Experiment 2: Additional Analysis
C.1 Additional results
Result A1: Higher incentives do not change the deviation of elicited from Bayesian
posteriors. Result 2 in section 5.2 has shown that higher incentives lead to more overopti-
mism. Why is that the case? There are two mechanisms through which this could happen. On
the one hand, with higher incentives, subjects will rationally elect a different distribution of
posterior beliefs. If the magnitude of the deviation of elicited from Bayesian posteriors varies
with the Bayesian posterior, this will translate into varying overoptimism overall. (Graphically,
this idea corresponds to a movement along the curve in figure 5.) On the other hand, it is
conceivable that incentives alter how much subjective beliefs deviate from Bayesian beliefs, for
any posterior. (This is represented by a change of the curve in figure 5.) To distinguish be-
tween these mechanisms, Columns 2 and 3 of Table C.15 display the relation between subjective
and Bayesian posterior beliefs separately for the high and the low incentive condition. They
are similarly close across these two conditions (Column 4 shows that a statistically significant
difference at the 5% level occurs only for the elicited posterior 0.25), suggesting that incen-
tives change the overall extent of overoptimism because they lead to a different distribution of
Bayesian posteriors, not because they induce people to distort a given Bayesian posterior to a
different extent.
Result A2: Elicited posteriors are not an ex post rationalization of the decision to
bet. The results about subjective posterior beliefs would be difficult to interpret if elicited
beliefs were simply an ex post rationalization of the decision to bet. To test whether this is
the case, I again consider the difference between elicited and objective posteriors. If elicited
beliefs were an ex post rationalization of the betting decision, then subjects who took the bet
should appear more optimistic than those who refused it, for any objective posterior. That is,
the graph in figure 6 should shift to the right if we consider only subjects who took the bet,
and should shift to the left if we only consider those who refused it. By contrast, if beliefs
inform the choice to bet, rather than ex post rationalize it, then objective and elicited beliefs
should track each other similarly closely, regardless of whether subjects took the bet. Hence, I
estimate Column 1 of Table C.16 separately for the cases in which subjects decided to bet, and
for the cases in which they abstained; Columns 2 and 3 of Table C.16 display the results. In
contrast to the ex post rationalization hypothesis, whenever the estimates differ at the 5%-level,
it is the subjects who decided to reject the gamble who are more overly optimistic (Column 4).
Hence, beliefs are not an ex post rationalization of the betting choice.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Objective Posterior Difference
Incentive Both High Low
Elicited Posterior
0 0.023* 0.014 0.034 -0.02
(0.013) (0.014) (0.024) (0.028)
0.05 0.087 0.089 0.084 0.005
(0.027) (0.036) (0.036) (0.046)
0.15 0.161 0.137 0.180 -0.042
(0.034) (0.046) (0.049) (0.069)
0.25 0.316* 0.214 0.383** -0.169***
(0.036) (0.047) (0.046) (0.061)
0.35 0.355 0.415 0.331 0.084
(0.034) (0.068) (0.040) (0.081)
0.45 0.441 0.498 0.413 0.084
(0.034) (0.059) (0.042) (0.073)
0.55 0.584 0.543 0.635* -0.093
(0.029) (0.038) (0.044) (0.058)
0.65 0.677 0.671 0.687 -0.016
(0.032) (0.039) (0.053) (0.064)
0.75 0.668** 0.625** 0.750 -0.125*
(0.035) (0.046) (0.057) (0.074)
0.85 0.768* 0.773 0.760 0.014
(0.042) (0.051) (0.064) (0.076)
0.95 0.883** 0.906 0.853* 0.053
(0.030) (0.039) (0.051) (0.066)
1 0.937** 0.918** 0.955* -0.037
(0.028) (0.041) (0.025) (0.037)
Observations 2,012 1,006 1,006 -
#Subj 503 503 503 -
Table C.15: All regressions pool across both information conditions (incentive first and
picture first). Standard errors clustered by subject. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical
significance by which objective and elicited posteriors differ. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Objective posterior Difference
Decision Both Accept Reject
Elicited posterior
0 0.023* 0.000 0.024* -0.024*
(0.013) (0.000) (0.014) (0.014)
0.05 0.087 0.473 0.080 0.393
(0.027) (0.355) (0.027) (0.356)
0.15 0.161 0.285 0.154 0.131
(0.034) (0.146) (0.034) (0.151)
0.25 0.316* 0.282 0.319* -0.037
(0.036) (0.108) (0.038) (0.115)
0.35 0.355 0.393 0.349 0.043
(0.034) (0.100) (0.036) (0.107)
0.45 0.441 0.531 0.420 0.111
(0.034) (0.080) (0.039) (0.092)
0.55 0.584 0.576 0.596 -0.02
(0.029) (0.038) (0.047) (0.061)
0.65 0.677 0.669 0.708 -0.039
(0.032) (0.037) (0.064) (0.074)
0.75 0.668** 0.699 0.507** 0.192**
(0.035) (0.038) (0.085) (0.093)
0.85 0.768* 0.805 0.472** 0.332**
(0.042) (0.040) (0.140) (0.141)
0.95 0.883** 0.922 0.591** 0.331**
(0.030) (0.027) (0.143) (0.146)
1 0.937** 0.959** 0.564 0.395
(0.028) (0.018) (0.277) (0.278)
Observations 2,012 930 1,082 -
#Subj 503 470 484 -
Table C.16: All regressions pool across both information conditions (incentive first and
picture first). Standard errors clustered by subject. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical
significance by which objective and elicited posteriors differ. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
C.2 Analysis of ancillary treatments
There were two ancillary treatments. In one, subjects decided whether to take a win $3 / lose
$3 bet. In the other, they decided whether to take a win $0.5 / lose $0.5 bet. In both cases,
they knew what their choice would be before they examined the picture. Table C.17 shows
how often subjects choose to take the bet in each treatment, both averaged over states, and
separated. Subjects take the gamble more often as stakes increase. This is because the false
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negative rate drops by a significant 7.02 percentage points (s.e. 2.92) whereas the false positive
rate is not statistically significantly different (it increases by 3.47 percentage points (s.e. 2.72)
as stakes increase). While the decrease in the false negative rate is consistent with the model in
section 4, that model would also predict a decrease in the false positive rate as stakes increase.
Risk aversion is as plausible countervailing factor that can explain the experimental results.
(1) (2) (3)
State Both Bad Good
Levels
Treatment (−3,+3) 48.64 29.19 68.09
(1.62) (2.07) (2.15)
Treatment (−0.5,+0.5) 43.37 25.72 61.03
(1.61) (1.99) (2.26)
Treatment effect 5.26** 3.47 7.06**
(2.23) (2.72) (2.92)
Number of observations 1906 969 937
Number of subjects 953 735 719
Table C.17: Unconditional and state-dependent participation probabilities in the ancillary
treatments. Standard errors clustered by subjects. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Asterisks are suppressed for levels.
Moreover, Figure C.9 plots estimates of Bayesian posteriors against elicited posteriors for
decisions in the ancillary treatments only, as Figure 5 had done for the main treatments. Again,
elicited posteriors track Bayesian posteriors remarkably closely. The only statistically significant
deviation is at the elicited posterior 0.25.
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Figure C.9: Elicited and objective posteriors for ancillary treatments only. Whiskers indicate
95% confidence intervals. Standard errors clustered by subject.
D Experimental Materials
D.1 Video transcription and stimuli pictures
Figure D.10 displays photographs of the insects used for the experiment in section 3. The
following is a transcription of the videos used in that experiment. The videos are available at
https://youtu.be/HiNnbYuuRcA (“Why you may want to eat insects”) and https://youtu.
be/ii4YSGOEcRY (“Why you may not want to eat insects”).
Transcription: Why You May Want to Eat Insects Five reasons you should consider
eating insects. For your own personal health, and for the overall health of the planet, and,
most importantly, for your pleasure, you should be eating more insects. This isn’t meant as
a provocative, theoretical idea. Here are five very serious reasons why you should consider
increasing your insect intake.
First, insects can be yummy. You’d think that insects would have a pungent, unusual
aroma. But they are actually very tasty, and considered a delicacy in many parts of the
world. Also, like tofu, they often take on the flavor of whatever they’re cooked with. That’s
why we are on the verge of a real insectivorous moment in consumer culture. The Brooklyn
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(A) (B)
(C) (D)
(E)
Figure D.10: Insects eaten by subjects. A. House cricket (acheta domesticus) B. Mole
cricket (gryllotalpae) C. Field cricket (gryllus bimaculatus) D. Mealworm (tenebrio molitor) F.
Silkworm pupa (bombyx mori).
28
startup Exo just started selling protein bars made from ground cricket flour, and the British
company Ento sells sushi-like bento boxes with cricket-based foods. The restaurant Don Bugito
in San Francisco’s Mission district offers creative insect-based foods inspired by Mexican pre-
hispanic and contemporary cuisine. “I am trying to bring a solution into the food market
which is introducing edible insects” [Monica Martinez, owner of Don Bugito]. New cookbooks
are entering the market, such as Daniella Martin’s ”Edible”, or van Huis et al.’s ”The insect
cookbook”. Don Bugito’s reviews on yelp are glowing. Most Americans need some courage to
take a bite. But once they do, they are pleasantly surprised. Morgane M., from Sunnyvale,
CA describes her experience: ”I saw their stand at the Ferry Building farmers market and
decided to take the plunge. I tried the chili-lime crickets and they were surprisingly good! For
the curious-but-apprehensive: the chili-lime crickets taste like flavorful, super crunchy (almost
flaky) chips. That’s it. If you’ve ever had super thin tortilla chips, you’ll have an idea what
to expect.” Other people liked them even more. For example Nelson Q. from Las Vegas, NV:
”This Pre-Hispanic Snackeria has made me a fan .... They had the most interesting menu items
of the evening at Off The Grid ... Would I try insects again??? Yessir!...ALOHA!!! ” Rodney H.
from San Francisco agrees: ”It’s great! And the mealworms add kind of a nice, savory quality
to it. You never would guess that you’re eating an insect.”
Second, insects are a highly nutritious protein source. “Insects are actually the most ... one
of the most efficient proteins on the planet“ [Monica Martinez]. It turns out that pound for
pound, insects provide much higher levels of protein compared to conventional meats like beef,
chicken, and fish. While eggs consist to just 12% proteins, and beef jerky clocks in at 33%, a
single pound of cricket flour has 65% protein. That’s twice as much as you get in beef jerky!
Insects also have much higher levels of nutrients like calcium, iron, and zinc. They are also
good sources of vitamin B12. That’s an essential vitamin that’s barely found in any plant-based
foods and thus can be difficult for vegans to come by.
Third, our objection to eating insects is arbitrary. Your first reaction to this movie was
probably a sense of dislike. But there’s nothing innate about that reaction. For one, billions of
people already eat insects in Asia, Africa, and Latin America every day. More generally, the
animals considered to be fit for consumption vary widely from culture to culture for arbitrary
reasons. Most Americans consider the idea of eating horses or dogs repugnant, even though
there’s nothing substantial that differentiates horses from cows. Meanwhile, in India, eating
cows is taboo, while eating goat is common. These random variations are the results of cultural
beliefs that crystallize over generations. But luckily, these arbitrary taboos can be defeated over
time. There was a time when raw fish – served as sushi – was seen as repugnant in mainstream
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US culture. Now it’s ubiquitous. Soon, insects – which are closely related to shrimp – may be
elegant hors d’oeuvres.
Fourth, insects are more sustainable than chicken, pork, or beef. “I think the biggest
problem for United States right now is we eating to much cattle, too much meat” [Monica
Martinez.] Insects are a serious solution to our increasingly pressing environmental problems.
It takes 2000 gallons of water to produce a single pound of beef, and 800 gallons for one pound of
pork. How much do you think is required for a pound of crickets? One single gallon! Producing
a pound of beef also takes thirteen times more arable land than raising a pound of crickets.
It needs twelve times as much feed, and produces 100 times as much greenhouse gases. These
very handsome environmental benefits are why the UN has released a 200 page report on how
eating insects could solve the world’s hunger and environmental problems just two years ago.
Needless to say, the UN strongly advocates for insects as a food source. And it’s not just the
UN. In 2011, the European Commission has offered a four million dollar prize to the group that
comes up with the best idea for developing insects as a popular food.
Five, we already eat insects all the time. The majority of processed foods you buy have
pieces of insect in them. The last jar of peanut butter you bought, for instance, may have had
up to 50 insect fragments. A bar of chocolate can have about 60 fragments of various insect
species. Some experts estimate that, in total, we eat about one or two pounds of insects each
year with our food. These insects pose no health risks. The FDA does set limits, but they are
simply set for aesthetic reasons in other words, so you don’t actually see them mixed into your
food.
To summarize, these are five very compelling reasons to give it a try. Five, we already
eat insects all the time anyway. Four, insects are more sustainable and ethical than chicken,
pork, or beef. Three, our objection to eating insects is completely arbitrary. Two, insects are
a highly nutritious protein source. One. ”Most of people react really, really positive” [Monica
Martinez]. Insects can be very tasty!
Transcription: Why You May Not Want to Eat Insects Four reasons you may want
to avoid eating insects. Reason 1. Some cultures eat insects. But to those of us who are not
used to it, insects can be... well, see for yourself. [American tourist in China] “Welcome to
eating crazy foods around the world with Mike. And we’re in China. If I’ve learned one thing
about China it’s they will eat absolutely everything. So you have caterpillars and you have
butterflies. The pupae is what the caterpillar turns into before it turns into a butterfly. ... they
don’t look very appealing at all. But ... try everything once. So, up to the face. Hhh.” [Eats
puppae.] “Not good. Ugh ... it ... it popped. It popped! It’s just ... it’s just too much for
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me.” [Throws remaining pupae into trash bin.] [Bear Grylls] “Whoa! Ready for this? Oh my
goodness! Pfh! This one has been living in there a very, very long time. I’m not gonna need to
eat for a week after this. Pfh.” [Eats live beetle larva.] “Argh! This actually ranks as one of
the worst things I’ve ever, ever eaten!”
Reason 2. Insects have many body parts. Most of those parts we do not usually eat in
other animals. Let’s see those parts... [Biology student] “Let’s take a closer look at some of the
structures we see on this grasshopper. So the first thing I want to point out is that it has six
legs. There are two pairs. Here is the pair of hindlegs. There’s a pair in the middle here, on
the middle segment of the thorax. Ok, those are the midlegs. And then there’s another pair on
the front here, those are the forelegs or prolegs. Ok? So there’s six altogether, all insects have
six legs, or three pairs of legs, it’s characteristic of the class. Ok? So we also can see, right up
here, there are a pair of wings. On each side of the body there are two wings. The forewing, k?
– as in the one in front – and this is the hindwing down here, ok? So there are four wings on
this animal. Other insects only have two, some have none. Now we’ll move up to the head. The
first thing you’ll notice is this pair of long antennae. Ok, we’ve seen antennae in other animals.
So, clearly, those are involved ... they have a sensory function. They’re usually involved in a
tactile, or a touch sensory function. Some of them are used in chemoreception, which would be
like a smell or taste. And speaking of sensory organs, we got one more here, which we would be
remiss to not mention, uhm, which is the large compound eye here. So, I’ve made an incision
on the dorsal surface of this grasshopper. Ok? And I’ve peeled back the exoskeleton. And
before I go digging too much, uhm, it’s going to be difficult to see many structures, but on
these individuals it’s very easy to see, uhm, all of these very large and pronounced little sort
of tubular looking structures. There’s one right there. Those are all eggs.”
Reason 3. When you eat an insect, you eat ALL of it. In particular, its digestive system,
including its stomach, intestine, rectum, anus, and whatever partially digested food is still in
there. [Biology student] “Now, if we move on to the digestive system... there is a mouth, of
course, we talked about that being down here, ok? The mouth opens into a small pharynx, ok?
And then it basically opens up into this large, dark, thin-walled sack right here, ok? This is the
crop. Ok, so this is basically a food storage pouch right in here. So ... getting to the stomach,
that’s what we find next, this thin-walled, sort of darker colored sack right here, which I’ve
just broken a little bit, that, uhm, is the stomach, all in here, ok? Below the stomach we find
this slightly darker and a bit more muscular tube right here. That is the intestine. And the
intestine opens into a short rectum and an anus.”
Reason 4. Edible insects are perfectly save to eat. Nonetheless, we tend to associate insects
with death and disease. Even if we know that eating some insects is harmless, this association
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is difficult to overcome. [Nature film maker] “Just a few days ago, one of those gaur was killed
by a tiger in the night. This carcass is now probably about five days old, and, as you can see,
absolutely riving with maggots of many different species.”
D.2 Instructions for the insect experiment
This section reproduces the instructions for the video treatment. The instructions for the no
information treatment are identical, except that no video is mentioned.
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ve	$20
	for	fol
lowing
	throug
h	with
	your	d
ecision
.	Hence
,	your	
to
ta
l	paym
ent	fro
m	part
	1	will	
be	$25
.	
• 
If,	at	th
e	end	o
f	this	s
tudy,	y
ou	dec
id
e	
no
t	t
o	
ea
t	the	fo
od	item
,	even	t
hough	
you	ha
ve	acc
epted	
the	off
er,	the
n	you	
will	no
t	
receive
	the	$
5	you	
were	
promis
ed	in	t
he	offe
r.	You	
will	als
o	forfe
it	the	$
20	you
	would
	have	r
eceived
	
for	foll
owing	
throug
h	with
	your	d
ecision
.	Hence
,	your	
to
ta
l	paym
ent	fro
m	
part	1	w
ill	be	$
0.		
	 If	you	r
ej
ec
t	the	of
fer:		
• 
You	wi
ll	recei
ve	the	
$20	yo
u	are	p
romise
d	for	fo
llowing
	throug
h	with
	your	
decisio
n.	Beca
use	you
	rejecte
d	the	o
ffer,	yo
u	will	n
ot	eat	a
	food	it
em,	an
d	you	
will	no
t	receiv
e	any	a
ddition
al	mon
ey	for	
part	1.
	Hence
,	your	t
ot
al
	payme
nt	
for	par
t	1	will
	be	$20
.		
	 	
	 	
	 	
	
M
ai
n	
D
ec
is
io
ns
	
	 	 Some	
partici
pants	
will	be
	prese
nted	w
ith	off
ers	to	
eat	sp
ecified
	food	
items	
in	
exchan
ge	for	$
3.	For	
instanc
e,	they
	will	de
cide	w
hether
	or	not
	to	acc
ept	off
ers	suc
h	
as	this	
one:	
	
Ea
t	[
sp
ec
ifi
ed
	fo
od
	it
em
].	
In
	e
xc
ha
ng
e,	
re
ce
iv
e	
$3
.	
	 	 	 Other	
partici
pants	
will	be
	prese
nted	w
ith	off
ers	to	
eat	sp
ecified
	food	
items	
in	
exchan
ge	for	
$30.	T
hose	p
articip
ants	w
ill	deci
de	whe
ther	or
	not	to
	accep
t	offers
	
such	as
	this	on
e:	
	
Ea
t	[
sp
ec
ifi
ed
	fo
od
	it
em
].	
In
	e
xc
ha
ng
e,	
re
ce
iv
e	
$3
0	
	 	 All	par
ticipan
ts	will	
be	offe
red	exa
ct
ly
	th
e	
sa
m
e	
food	it
ems,	an
d	in	th
e	same
	amoun
t,	
regard
less	of	
how	m
uch	the
y	are	p
aid.	Th
e	only	
differe
nce	is	t
hat	som
e	parti
cipants
	
will	be
	offered
	a	high
er	amo
unt	of	m
oney	fo
r	eating
	any	giv
en	food
	item.	
	 There	
are	five
	differe
nt	food
	items	
in	this	
study.	
For	eac
h	of	th
e	food	
items	y
ou	will
	
make	a
	decisi
on	suc
h	as	th
e	abov
e.	You	
will	eit
her	be
	offere
d	$3	in
	excha
nge	for
	
eating	
the	ite
m	in	a
ll	thes
e	decis
ions,	o
r	you	w
ill	be	o
ffered	
$30	in
	excha
nge	for
	
eating	
the	item
	in	all	o
f	these
	decisio
ns.	
	 There	
is	an	8
0%
	c
ha
nc
e	that	
at	the	
end	of	
this	stu
dy,	the
	compu
ter	sele
cts	one
	of	
these	f
ive	ma
in	deci
sions	to
	be	car
ried	ou
t.		
	 	 	 	
	
Part	1	
consist
s	of	the
	follow
ing	8	st
eps.		
	
St
ep
	1
:	L
ea
rn
	h
ow
	m
uc
h	
m
on
ey
	y
ou
	w
ill
	b
e	
of
fe
re
d	
in
	th
e	
m
ai
n	
de
ci
si
on
s	
	
At	the	
beginn
ing	of	
the	exp
erimen
t,	you	
will	cli
ck	a	bu
tton	to
	make	
the	com
puter	
random
ly	deci
de	wh
ether	y
ou	wil
l	be	of
fered	$
30	in	
all	five
	main	
decisio
ns,	or	
whethe
r	you	w
ill	be	o
ffered	$
3	in	all
	five	m
ain	dec
isions.	
	 The	co
mputer
	will	im
mediat
ely	tell
	you	w
hich	on
e	got	se
lected.	
		
	 	
St
ep
	2
:	V
id
eo
	
	 The	fo
od	item
s	in	th
is	stud
y	may	
be	unf
amiliar
	to	yo
u.	To	h
elp	yo
u	with
	your	
decisio
ns,	you
	will	ch
oose	vi
deos	to
	watch
.	
	 You	wi
ll	watc
h	the	v
ideo	yo
u	selec
ted	bef
or
e	you	m
ake	any
	decisio
ns	rega
rding	f
ood	
items.	
		
	 	
St
ep
	3
:	D
ec
is
io
n	
Li
st
s,
	r
ou
nd
	1
	
	 	 You	wi
ll	fill	in
	five	d
ecision
	lists	s
imilar	
to	the	
one	be
low,	on
e	for	e
ach	of	
the	fiv
e	
food	ite
ms.		
	
	
	 The	foo
d	items
	will	be
	descri
bed	in	
words.
	No	fur
ther	in
format
ion	wil
l	be	giv
en.		
	 There	i
s	a	7	p
er
ce
nt
	chance
	that	at
	the	en
d	of	thi
s	study
,	the	co
mputer
	selects
	one	of
	
the	dec
isions	y
ou	mak
e	in	on
e	of	the
se	five	
lists	to
	be	car
ried	ou
t	
	 	 	 	 	
St
ep
	4
:	M
ai
n	
de
ci
si
on
s	
	 It	is	at
	this	st
age	tha
t	you	w
ill	mak
e	the	f
ive	ma
in	deci
sions	t
hat	we
re	desc
ribed	
before.
	The	fo
od	item
s	will	b
e	descr
ibed	in
	words
.	No	fu
rther	i
nforma
tion	w
ill	be	
given.	T
here	is
	a	80%
	c
ha
nc
e	that	o
ne	of	th
e	decis
ions	yo
u	make
	in	this
	part	w
ill	be	
carried
	out.	
	 	
St
ep
	5
:	S
ur
ve
y	
	 You	wi
ll	answ
er	som
e	surve
y	ques
tions.		
Your	a
nswers
	do	not
	affect	
your	p
aymen
t	
from	th
is	stud
y.		
	 	
St
ep
	6
:	F
oo
d	
it
em
s	
ha
nd
ou
t	
	 Each	p
articip
ant	wil
l	be	giv
en	five
	contai
ners,	e
ach	con
taining
	one	of
	the	fiv
e	food	
items.	
You	ma
y	close
ly	insp
ect	the
	food	it
ems.		
	 	
St
ep
	7
:	D
ec
is
io
n	
Li
st
s,
	r
ou
nd
	2
	
	 You	wi
ll	fill	in
	five	de
cision	l
ists	as	
before,
	one	fo
r	each	
of	the	f
ive	foo
d	items
.		
	 There	i
s	a	7	p
er
ce
nt
	chance
	that	at
	the	en
d	of	thi
s	study
,	the	co
mputer
	selects
	one	of
	
the	dec
isions	y
ou	mak
e	in	on
e	of	the
se	five	
lists	to
	be	car
ried	ou
t	
	 	
St
ep
	8
:	A
dd
it
io
na
l	d
ec
is
io
ns
	
	 You	wi
ll	make
	a	num
ber	of	
additio
nal	dec
isions.	
You	wi
ll	learn
	what	t
hese	ar
e	later.
	
There	
is	a	6	
pe
rc
en
t	chan
ce	that
	one	o
f	these
	decisi
ons	wi
ll	be	c
arried	
out	for
	
payme
nt.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
Su
m
m
ar
y	
of
	p
ar
t	1
	
	 Let's	re
cap.	He
re's	ho
w	part
	1	proc
eeds:		
	 1. 
You	lea
rn	how
	much	
money
	you	w
ill	later
	be	offe
red	in	e
xchang
e	for	ea
ting	
food	ite
ms	(in	
step	4	
below)
.		
	 2. The
	food	it
ems	in
	this	st
udy	ma
y	be	un
familia
r	to	you
.	To	he
lp	you	
with	yo
ur	
decisio
ns,	you
	may	se
lect	cho
ose	vid
eos	to	w
atch.		
	 3.
 
D
ec
is
io
n	
lis
ts
,	r
ou
nd
	1
.	You	w
ill	fill	in
	five	de
cision	l
ists,	on
e	for	ea
ch	of	fi
ve	
differe
nt	food
	items.
	The	fo
od	item
s	will	b
e	descr
ibed	in
	words
,	but	no
	
further
	inform
ation	w
ill	be	g
iven.		
	
Th
er
e	
is	
a	
7%
	ch
an
ce
	th
at
	o
ne
	o
f	t
he
se
	d
ec
isi
on
s	w
ill
	b
e	
ca
rr
ie
d	
ou
t.	
	 4. Ma
in
	d
ec
is
io
ns
.	You	w
ill	mak
e	five	d
ecision
s	whet
her	or	
not	to	p
articip
ate	a	
transac
tion	su
ch	as	th
is:		
	
"C
on
su
m
e	
[s
pe
ci
fie
d	
fo
od
	it
em
].	
In
	e
xc
ha
ng
e,	
re
ce
iv
e	
$[
pa
ym
en
t]
".	
	 You	wi
ll	eithe
r	be	off
ered	pa
ym
en
t	=
	$30	in
	all	five
	decisio
ns,	or	y
ou	will
	be	
offered
	payme
nt
	=
	$3	for	
all	five
	decisio
ns.	Aga
in,	the	
food	ite
ms	wil
l	be	
describ
ed	in	w
ords,	b
ut	no	fu
rther	in
format
ion	wil
l	be	giv
en.	
	 Ther
e	
is	
an
	8
0%
	ch
an
ce
	th
at
	o
ne
	o
f	t
he
se	five	
de
ci
sio
ns
	w
ill
	b
e	
ca
rr
ie
d	
ou
t.	
	 5. You
	will	co
mplete
	a	shor
t	surve
y.	
	 6. Foo
d	items
	will	be
	hande
d	out,	a
nd	you
	will	be
	able	to
	inspec
t	them	
as	clos
ely	
as	you	
wish.		
	 7.
 
D
ec
is
io
n	
lis
ts
,	r
ou
nd
	2
.	You	w
ill	fill	in
	five	de
cision	l
ists,	on
e	for	ea
ch	of	fi
ve	
differe
nt	food
	items.
	
	
Th
er
e	
is	
a	
7%
	ch
an
ce
	th
at
	o
ne
	o
f	t
he
se
	d
ec
isi
on
s	w
ill
	b
e	
ca
rr
ie
d	
ou
t.	
	
8.
 
Additio
nal	dec
isions.	
These	w
ill	be	ex
plained
	later.	
	
Th
er
e	
is	
a	
6%
	ch
an
ce
	th
at
	o
ne
	o
f	t
he
se
	d
ec
isi
on
s	w
ill
	b
e	
ca
rr
ie
d	
ou
t.	
	
At	the	v
ery	end
	of	this
	study,
	the	co
mputer
	will	ra
ndomly
	select	
exactly
	one	of
	
your	de
cisions
	from	t
his	par
t	to	be	
carried
	out,	ac
cording
	to	the	
chance
s	
specifie
d	abov
e.		
	 	 This	ch
art	illu
strates
	the	ch
ances	t
hat	a	d
ecision
	from	a
ny	give
n	step	
of	part
	1	
will	be
	chosen
	to	be	c
arried	
out:		
	
	
	
Pa
rt
s	
2	
an
d	
3	
	 The	ins
tructio
ns	for	p
arts	2	a
nd	3	of
	this	st
udy	wi
ll	be	di
splayed
	on	you
r	scree
n	
right	b
efore	th
ose	par
ts	begi
n.		
	 	 	 Yo
u	
no
w
	h
av
e	
5	
m
in
ut
es
	to
	re
ad
	th
ro
ug
h	
th
es
e	
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
	o
n	
yo
ur
	o
w
n	
pa
ce
.	
	
If	
yo
u	
ha
ve
	a
ny
	q
ue
st
io
ns
	a
bo
ut
	th
is	
st
ud
y,	
pl
ea
se
	ra
ise
	y
ou
r	h
an
d.
	W
e	
w
ill
	co
m
e	
by
	
an
d	
an
sw
er
	th
em
	p
ri
va
te
ly
.	
	 	 	 	 	
Re
ca
ll	
	
Th
is	
is	
a	
st
ud
y	
of
	in
di
vi
du
al
	d
ec
isi
on
	m
ak
in
g.
	H
en
ce
,	y
ou
	a
re
	n
ot
	a
llo
w
ed
	to
	ta
lk
.	
	
Pl
ea
se
	d
o	
no
t	u
se
	ce
ll	
ph
on
es
	o
r	o
th
er
	e
le
ct
ro
ni
c	d
ev
ic
es
	u
nt
il	
af
te
r	t
he
	st
ud
y	
is	
ov
er
.	
Al
so
,	d
o	
no
t	b
ro
w
se
	th
e	
in
te
rn
et
,	o
r	c
he
ck
	y
ou
r	e
m
ai
ls.
	If
	w
e	
do
	fi
nd
	y
ou
	d
oi
ng
	o
ne
	o
f	
th
es
e	
th
in
gs
,	t
he
	ru
le
s	o
f	t
he
	st
ud
y	
re
qu
ir
e	
us
	to
	d
ed
uc
t	$
20
	fr
om
	y
ou
r	p
ay
m
en
t.	
Th
e	
on
ly
	e
xc
ep
tio
n	
to
	th
is	
ru
le
	co
nc
er
ns
	th
e	
ca
lc
ul
at
or
s	t
ha
t	a
re
	p
ro
vi
de
d	
on
	y
ou
r	d
es
k.
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D.3 Instructions for the experiment in the stylized setting
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